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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
International trade can be defined as the mutual exchange of goods and services between 
countries.1 The benefits of international trade are well documented and include consumers 
gaining access to foreign goods and services, increased competition that stimulates demand 
and supply, and the promotion of foreign direct investment.2 Despite these benefits, a number 
of countries impede the flow of international trade by imposing trade barriers. This is known 
as protectionism.3 On the other hand, liberalisation refers to deregulation and a decrease in 
trade barriers.4 There has been on-going debate on protectionism and liberalisation since the 
inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948.5 
 
This debate is even more important in international agricultural trade. On the one hand, 
countries have entered into the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) with the purpose of 
liberalising international agricultural trade, whereas on the other, export subsidies, and high 
tariffs continue to act as forms of protectionism. This study critically analyses the main 
elements of the AoA and its impact on South Africa. This chapter provide a useful 
background and an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE TO SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The South African Constitution6 promotes basic human values such as dignity, equality and 
freedom.7 The Constitution also provides for ‘food security rights’.8 It mentions food in three 
sections: section 27(1)(b) on the state’s obligation to achieve the progressive realisation of 
                                               
1Reem Heakal ‘What is international trade?’ available at http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/112503.asp, 
accessed on 25 April 2014. 
2Ibid. 
3BM Hoekman & PC Mavroidis Global Institutions: The World Trade Organisation Law, Economics, and 
Politics (2007) 20. 
4Ibid 20. 
5Ibid 20. 
6Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7South African Human Rights Commission ‘The Right to Food’ (2014) 5th Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series 2002/2003, 1.  




the right to access to sufficient food and water, section 28(1)(c) on a child’s right to basic 
nutrition and section 35(2)(e) on a prisoner’s right to adequate nutrition.9 
 
With this background in mind, agriculture is an important contributor to the South African 
economy as it creates jobs and boosts incomes in rural communities.10 The South African 
agricultural industry employs approximately 750 000 people11 with a further 320 000 
employed seasonally.12 Furthermore, six million South Africans depend on subsistence 
agriculture.13 According to Statistics South Africa, one in every two Rand spent by South 
African households goes towards housing and food.14 Therefore, the South African 
agricultural industry promotes the basic food security rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
1.3 GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AGRICULTURE 
 
Like South Africa, agricultural industries in other countries promote job creation and rural 
development. Food security has also taken a front seat in world affairs. Many countries are 
feeling the pressure to feed their growing populations. China is currently researching methods 
to produce its own food in urban areas. One proposal is to build skyscrapers known as ‘farm 
scrapers’.15 These are futuristic, tall urban buildings that provide space to residents to grow 
food crops.16 This proposal demonstrates how significant agriculture is to the global 
economy.   
 
Furthermore, many primary agricultural products can be processed into useful secondary 
products. For example, a primary product such as milk can be processed into a secondary 
product such as cheese. More importantly, maize, a primary food product, is being processed 
into an energy source, bio fuels.  Therefore the impact of agricultural regulation is felt across 
different industries, affecting employment and international trade in those industries as well. 
                                               
9 Ibid 1. 
10Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs ‘Agricultural policy in South Africa, A Discussion Document’ 
(1998) available at http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/policy/policy98.htm, accessed on 24 April 2014.   
11TRADE Research Niche Area ‘Diagnostics of South Africa’s Agricultural Trade Competitiveness’ (2013) 
prepared by the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences North-West University, 104. 
12Centre for Rural Studies ‘Briefing Paper: Agricultural Trade, Globalisation and Farm Workers’ (2003), 2. 
13Ibid 2. 
14StatsSA ‘What do South Africans spend their money on’ available at http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?p=944, 
accessed on 25 April 2014. 
15IO9 ‘China’s farm scrapers are high-rises that will generate their own food’ available at 





1.4 SOUTH AFRICA AS A GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL CONTRIBUTOR 
 
In addition to providing food to millions of South Africans, the country’s agricultural sector 
exports many products to other parts of the globe. South Africa’s total agricultural exports 
increased from US$3.2 billion in 1992 to US$9.6 billion in 2011.17 This demonstrates that 
exports provide valuable income to the South African agricultural industry.  
 
Since the advent of democracy, South Africa’s agricultural products have been exported to 
more destinations. From 1995 to 2011, the sector’s export destinations increased from 14 to 
78,18 an increase of 64 in 16 years. Furthermore, annual growth in South Africa’s agricultural 
sector has kept pace with global growth rates19 with the country ranked the 32nd biggest 
global producer of agricultural products.20 This demonstrates that the South Africa 
agricultural industry is a significant contributor to global trade. 
 
1.5 AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an international forum where member countries 
negotiate international trade rules and resolve trade problems with one another. The entire 
system of international trade is referred to as the ‘multilateral trading system’ (MTS).21 This 
is a consensus based system, meaning that every member country at the WTO has to agree 
for a particular rule to be adopted. This ensures free and fair trade between member 
countries.22 
 
South Africa’s trade policy with regard to the agricultural sector is export-oriented.23 Whilst 
this approach enhances access to foreign currency, it also binds the country to the rules of 
international trade because South Africa is a member of the WTO. South Africa’s legal 
obligation to comply with international trade rules is significant due to the ‘single 
undertaking’ principle that underlies state commitments to the WTO. This principle forms 
                                               




21World Trade Organisation ‘How the negotiations are organised’ available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm, accessed on 22 May 2014. 
22Ibid. 
23D.B Wilkins et al ‘Animal Welfare: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations’ (2005) 24 (2) Scientific 




part of the WTO process and refers to the fact that every item on the agenda must be 
negotiated and agreed to between WTO members as a package, as opposed to each item 
being separately negotiated and agreed.24 
 
Since agriculture plays a key role in South Africa and across the globe, it is important to 
establish how the WTO regulates this sector. The WTO has recognised the significance of 
agriculture by establishing a separate agreement, the AoA.25 The preamble to the AoA 
declares that the long-term objective of WTO members is ‘to establish a fair and market 
oriented agricultural trading system.’26 However, historically, agriculture has been a thorny 
issue between developed and developing nations. This is possibly due to the complexity of 
agriculture negotiations at the WTO, with some member counties arguing that some areas of 
agriculture are over regulated, and others arguing that there is not sufficient regulation.27 
 
1.6 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
As noted above, the long-term objective of the AoA is ‘to establish a fair and market oriented 
agricultural trading system.’ Therefore, by implication, the Agreement aims to foster 
international agricultural trade and reduce current barriers. 
 
This study critically analyses the core components of the AoA in order to understand its 
underlying concepts as well as the positive views and criticisms levelled against this 
Agreement. In order to contextualise the AoA, the study highlights the development of the 
AoA through the various WTO negotiations. 
 
Although the AoA was a milestone in the history of the WTO some aspects of this 
Agreement have left a bad taste in member countries’ mouths. These include the way the 
Agreement deals with dumping agricultural products and its provisions on food aid to 
                                               
24World Trade Organisation (note 21 above). 
25Agreement on Agriculture in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. 
26Preamble to Agreement on Agriculture in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. 
27M.G Desta ‘Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture from its Uruguay Round Origins to its Post-Hong Kong Directions’ (2006) FAO Legal Papers 




developing countries. This study will also critically examine criticisms directed against 
developed countries for providing agricultural subsidies to domestic farmers. 
 
Furthermore, it offers a critical analysis of the AoA’s impact on South Africa’s agricultural 
import and export policy. Finally, the thesis analyses the outcome of the Bali Conference and 
provides an indication of possible future developments for the AoA. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Five research objectives were formulated: 
 
1.7.1 To critically reflect on the history and development of agricultural regulation within 
the International Trade Organisation, GATT and the WTO; 
 
1.7.2 To critically examine the core components of the AoA; 
 
1.7.3    To investigate and examine positive views and criticisms of the AoA; 
 
1.7.4   To critically describe the extent to which the AoA has impacted agricultural trade in 
South Africa and its trade partners with a focus on BRICS28; 
 
1.7.5   To analyse the Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali with a view to determining the 
extent to which decisions taken at the Conference will affect the AoA. 
 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters:  
 
                                               
28BRICS is the acronym for the economic partnership between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
The acronym was developed by Goldman Sachs, who forecast that the first four developing countries will be 
major economies by the year 2050. This study submits that the BRICS alliance is of enormous significance to 
South Africa. The fact that South Africa was invited to join BRICS demonstrates the political stature the country 
has attained in the eyes of the international community and the South African economy’s potential in the years 
to come. Investopedia defines ‘BRICS’ available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brics.asp accessed on 




1.8.1 Chapter one presents the background to the study, the problem statement and the 
objectives. 
 
1.8.2 Chapter two explores the history and development of the MTS, focusing on the 
development of global agricultural regulation through each of the various negotiation rounds 
of GATT and the WTO. 
 
1.8.3 Chapter three explains and critically analyses the main elements of the AoA with an 
emphasis on market access, domestic support and export subsidies. 
 
1.8.4 Chapter four studies the AoA in the context of the South African agricultural industry, 
and explores how this sector may be impacted by the country’s relationship with BRICS. 
 
1.8.5 Chapter five identifies the key decisions of the 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference, and 
critically analyses how the Conference impacted the AoA. 
 























LEGAL HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The rivalry between developed and developing countries is more pronounced in agriculture 
than any other global industry.29 It has been argued that developed countries have built 
powerful agricultural industries through years of domestic support and investment30, while 
developing countries such as India who now have the resources to invest in domestic 
agriculture are hampered by objections from developed countries.31 As a result, agriculture 
negotiations have been and continue to be an extremely contentious issue in multilateral trade 
negotiations. 
 
This chapter examines the various stages of development of the Multilateral Trade System 
(MTS), focusing on agricultural negotiations. It is divided into three sections: 
 
i) Section A introduces the MTS and its main institutions; 
ii) Section B presents a detailed discussion on the current principles that bind the 
MTS; and 
iii) Section C hones in on the agriculture negotiations during the various General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds and World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Ministerial Conferences. 
 
This chapter is useful in contextualising the formation of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA). Furthermore, the identification and critical analysis of important events in respect of 
                                               
29World Trade Organisation ‘WTO negotiations: agriculture and developing countries’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm47_e.htm, accessed on 17 October 2014.  
30Timothy Wise ‘Will the WTO fast-track trade at the expense of food security?’ available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/wto-negotiations-food-security-20147237431402983.html, 





the development of the AoA prepare the reader for the legal analysis of this Agreement in 
chapter 3. 
 
2.2 SECTION A: INSTITUTIONS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 
 
The MTS has been described as a political process for the complex negotiation of trade rules 
between member countries.32 The idea of an MTS to govern trade originated with the USA; it 
later developed into the GATT and finally the WTO. The WTO regulates international trade 
by facilitating trade negotiations and encouraging the development of the least developed 
economies. From the USA’s proposal of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) in 1945 
to the WTO’s Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013, the MTS has developed over 68 years. 
This section provides a brief historical account of the development of these institutions within 
the MTS. Details on GATT and WTO rounds follow in section C.  
 
2.2.1 The International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
 
By 1945, the ravages of World War Two (WWII) had resulted in poor economic growth for 
many major economies. Governments used forms of protectionism to protect domestic 
industries from foreign competition.33 This naturally caused a decrease in international trade 
and there were fears of a global recession. 
 
The USA took the lead and proposed the formation of a trade organisation to regulate 
international trade. It referred to this proposed organisation as the ‘International Trade 
Organisation’ (ITO) which would stand alongside the remaining two Bretton Woods 
organisations- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.34 A committee 
was established in 1946 and met to work on a charter for the proposed organisation. Within 
two years, the Havana Charter was complete. 
 
                                               
32Chapter 2: The multilateral trade system available athttp://www.unc.edu/~toatley/poli140/Chapter_2.pdf 
accessed on 17October 2014. 
33Barkema et al ‘Agriculture and the GATT: A Time for Change’ (1989) Economic Review, 22.  




However, after the formulation of the Charter, the ITO encountered major opposition, 
ironically from the USA35 which objected to its formation on the grounds that it could not 
persuade its legislature to accept it.36 It was later discovered that the reason why the USA 
legislature rejected the ITO was because of its interest in the GATT being negotiated in 
Geneva at the time. 
 
Eight countries, including the USA, agreed to the GATT.37 With the withdrawal of US 
support for the ITO, other nations followed. The ITO was scrapped and the GATT regulated 
international trade. However, all was not lost, as elements of the Havana Charter would later 
become part of the GATT. 
 
2.2.2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
 
The failure of the ITO led to the development of an instrument that would regulate 
international trade for four decades.38 The GATT came into being in 1948 and was driven by 
political bargaining at government and non-governmental level.39 The preamble of the GATT 
stated that its purpose was the ‘substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the 
elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis’.40 Procedurally, 
members agreed on binding principles and that negotiations under the GATT should take 
place as a series of trade rounds where issues could be debated between member countries.41 
 
The GATT also contained international trade rules that were agreed between signatory 
countries and was mainly known for its default tariffs that members could impose. These 
were useful to companies who intended doing business overseas as it helped them to calculate 
their cost of sales when accessing foreign markets. 
                                               
35D Drache ‘The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organization: Lessons for 
Our Time’ (2000) CSGR Working Paper No. 62/00 Centre for Canadian Studies, York University, 2. 
36Ibid 2. 
37The other countries were the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Trade_Organization accessed on 2 June 
2014; and D Drache ‘The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade Organization: Lessons for 
Our Time’ (2000) CSGR Working Paper No. 62/00 Centre for Canadian Studies, York University, 37. 
38World Trade Organisation ‘The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 16 October 2014. 
39Hoekman & Mavroidis (note 3 above) 20. 
40World Trade Organisation (note 38 above).   





The historical development of the GATT demonstrates that agriculture was regulated 
differently from other industries. A possible reason could be the context and role of 
agriculture in the early GATT years, and how certain countries dealt with agriculture.42 
 
For example, in 1933, the USA passed its Agricultural Adjustment Act which gave the 
government wide powers of control over the domestic agricultural industry. These included 
imposing quantitative restrictions, providing farm subsidies and increasing tariffs for 
imported agricultural products.43 The objective of the Act was to promote a healthy domestic 
agricultural industry.  
 
In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) adopted a Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).44 This was similar to the USA Agricultural Adjustment Act. Farm incomes were 
ensured through subsidies and tariffs.45 This meant that two of the world’s largest economies 
at the time had domestic agricultural support programs in place. This placed agriculture in a 
politically delicate position which resulted in its special treatment.  This study focuses on two 
main aspects of special treatment, i) agricultural subsidies and ii) agricultural quantitative 
restrictions.46 
 
i) Agricultural Subsidies 
While GATT’s general rules prohibited export subsidies for other industries, in the original 
wording of the GATT, agricultural subsidies were permitted as long as parties reported them. 
Article XVI stated that ‘any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which 
operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of 




                                               
42Sharma ‘Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e04.htm accessed on 2 June 2014. 
43Ibid. 
44Barkema et al (note 33 above) 23. 






In 1955 the original wording was extended to the following: 
‘Contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of export subsidies on the export of primary 
products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy 
which operates to increase the export of the primary product from its territory, such subsidy 
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the 
contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and 
any such special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the 
product’48(emphasis added). 
  
This increased the complexity of this issue as certain terms were not defined.49 While terms 
such as ‘equitable share of world export trade’ and ‘representative base period’ were 
discussed and negotiated during GATT trade rounds50, attempts to clarify their meaning were 
unsuccessful.51 This further entrenched the special treatment afforded to agriculture within 
the GATT framework.52 
 
ii) Quantitative Restrictions 
Article XI:2 of the GATT allowed for certain exceptions53 that were effectively import 
restrictions that a government could impose in order to restrict foreign agricultural products 
that competed with domestic agricultural products.54 In essence Article XI made it legitimate 
for governments to apply strict import restrictions without necessarily restricting domestic 




                                               
48Ibid. 
49Ibid. 
50Sharma & Pearce ‘Export Subsidies’ available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7353e/x7353e03.htm 
accessed on 3 March 2015. 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid. 
53‘Import restrictions can be applied on any agricultural or fishery product imported in any form necessary to the 
enforcement of governmental measures that operate to: restrict the production or marketing of the like domestic 
product or of a domestic product that is a close substitute; remove a temporary surplus of a like domestic 
product by making the surplus available to groups of domestic consumers free or at reduced prices; restrict the 
quantities produced of any animal product that is directly dependent wholly or mainly on the imported product.’ 
More available at Sharma ‘Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account’ available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e04.htm accessed on 2 June 2014. 




Barkema stated the position succinctly: under the GATT, most industries’ domestic policy 
had to conform to international trade law, but with agriculture, international trade law had to 
conform to a developed nation’s domestic policy, specifically the USA domestic policy on 
agriculture.55 
 
In summary, GATT provided for agricultural subsidies and strict border control. This 
hampered the liberalisation of agricultural trade. GATT made it possible for developed 
countries to fully support their agricultural industries, limit the quantity of imported 
agricultural products and to export their agricultural surplus to developing countries with 
little regard for their domestic industries.56 It is thus not surprising that the AoA addresses 
these three major areas: subsidies, domestic support and market access. 
 
2.2.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
In April 1994, 123 countries met in Marrakesh and signed an agreement which changed the 
face of international trade.57 The WTO officially came into existence on 1 January 1995 and 
is the successor to and incorporates the GATT.58 With the introduction of the WTO, the 
original GATT 1947 was not legally binding as most of its provisions and legal instruments 
were transferred to GATT 1994.59 Further GATT 1994 is set out in Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement.60 The general purpose of the WTO is to ‘facilitate the implementation, 
administration and operation as well as to further the objectives of the WTO agreements61’.62 
 
                                               
55 Ibid. 
56Sharma (note 42 above). 
57World Trade Organisation ‘The Uruguay Round’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm,accessed on 16 October 2014. 
58Ibid. 
59H Löberbauer ‘Questions on International Economic Law and Institutions’ available at 
http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/58631/questions-on-international-economic-law-and-institutions, accessed on 
17 October 2014. 
60 Ibid. 
61WTO members bind themselves to three kinds of agreements: i) Single multilateral agreements which bind all 
members upon entry to the WTO. These agreements are thus compulsory; ii) Plurilateral agreements that bind 
only those members that accede to corresponding WTO legal instruments. These are thus optional; and iii) 
Bilateral agreements that bind those members who voluntarily enter into trade relationships with each other. 
These are thus also optional. 




The WTO consists inter alia of the Ministerial Committee and the General Council.63 The 
Ministerial Committee consists of representatives of all WTO members and meets every two 
years. It is considered the organisation’s main body as it makes all decisions on trade related 
matters.64 On the other hand, the General Council is policy orientated and includes the 
dispute settlement body and trade monitoring mechanisms.65 The main functions of the WTO 
include: implementing multilateral trade agreements, providing a forum for trade negotiations 
between its members, administering trade disputes and finally co-operation with the World 
Bank and the IMF on fiscal policy.66 
 
At this point it is important to note that individuals and companies do not have jurisdiction 
before the WTO. For example a South African citizen or company cannot appear before the 
WTO and make submissions. Only government ministers from member countries may 
participate in WTO negotiations and disputes.67 Thus citizens and companies must lobby 
their government to voice their issues at WTO level.68 
 
The WTO also served as a fresh alternative to a la carte system. Under the GATT, there were 
several different instruments, with different parties linked to each agreement.69 The problem 
was that each agreement provided its own dispute resolution mechanism with a different 
adjudication body.70 The WTO introduced the single undertaking principle71 whereby all 
members accept the same rights and obligations and a single dispute resolution mechanism.72 
 
In addition to the creation of the WTO, the Uruguay Round facilitated the AoA which came 
into effect in January 1995.73 The preamble to the AoA states that its long-term objective is to 
                                               






69Centre For Studies and Research In International Law and International Relations ‘The World Trade 
Organization’ (1997) 60. 
70Ibid 60. 
71Article II of Marrakesh Agreement: ‘The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 
2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding 
on all Members.’  
72Centre For Studies and Research In International Law and International Relations (note 69 above) 61. 





establish a fair, market-oriented agricultural trading system.74 Chapter three of this thesis 
presents a comprehensive legal analysis of main areas of the AoA. 
 
2.3 SECTION B: PRINCIPLES OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 
 
Five principles underlie the MTS: a) non-discrimination, b) reciprocity, c) enforceable 




As noted in chapter one, protectionism in international trade means that a country has policies 
in place that promote the production and consumption of domestic goods over foreign 
goods.75 The non-discrimination principle is broken up into two elements: the most-favoured-
nation (MFN) rule and the national treatment (NT) principle. Both ensure that discrimination 
does not impact a member country’s market access.  
 
The MFN rule is part of the WTO policy on non-discrimination and is embedded in article I 
of GATT.76 This rule essentially states that all foreign products should be treated the same at 
a country’s borders. In other words, every foreign product should be treated equally by a 
WTO member. For example, if South Africa were to raise tariffs against Ireland for no 
particular reason, it would have to raise tariffs for its other trade partners across the board. 
Therefore any condition imposed by a country must be imposed on an MFN basis, i.e. any 
advantage or disadvantage will be immediately and unconditionally extended to all WTO 
members.77 
 
However, the MFN rule is not absolute. Exceptions include free trade areas, customs unions, 
preferential treatment of developing countries and the WTO non-application clause.78 A 
further exception is the use of an anti-dumping tariff by a WTO member.79 
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The NT principle is embedded in article III of GATT. This rule essentially states that once a 
foreign product has satisfied a country’s border requirements, it should be treated no less 
favourably than domestic products.80 In other words, foreign products and domestic products 
should be treated equally within a WTO member country.81 However, two policies are 
specifically exempt from NT obligations, i) subsidies- government schemes that grant 
benefits to specific entities and ii) government procurement- government entities purchasing 
goods with no intention of reselling them.82 
 
This study is of the opinion that South Africa’s black economic empowerment (BEE) 
legislation may violate the NT principle as it awards businesses points for purchasing local 
goods over foreign goods.83 These are used to rate tender applications and can attract various 
tax incentives. The effect of BEE legislation is that foreign goods are discriminated against 
within South Africa’s borders.  
 
b) Reciprocity  
The principle of reciprocity is part of WTO negotiation practice. Reciprocity can be defined 
as ‘the practice of exchanging things with others for mutual benefit, especially privileges 
granted by one country or organization to another’.84 In other words reciprocity represents the 
quid pro quo in WTO negotiations.85 For example, if Malawi extends favourable trade terms 
on cattle to South Africa, the principle of reciprocity ensures that South Africa will offer 
favourable trade terms on a product that Malawi imports from South Africa. Therefore 
reciprocity ensures that every country has an opportunity to gain from trade negotiations at 
the WTO.  
 
c) Enforceable Commitments 
 
The MTS comprises member countries that have committed themselves to the various 
instruments regulating international trade. These aim to promote fairness and equity in 
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international trade. If a country dishonours its commitments, the system must ensure that 
fairness and equity are restored. It is on the basis of this principle, that the WTO has 
established a dispute settlement procedure. This reinforces the organisation’s credibility in 
regulating international trade. 
 
As an example, if South Africa identifies actions or policies adopted by Zimbabwe that have 
the effect of undermining Zimbabwe’s commitments under the WTO, South Africa must first 
notify the government of Zimbabwe and request that the policy or action be rectified.86 
Should Zimbabwe fail to address this request, South Africa may use the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure. An independent panel will be appointed and both parties will have the 
opportunity to state their case. As noted above, only governments have jurisdiction to appear 
before the WTO. Therefore private parties would have to call upon their governments to 
intervene in international trade related disputes.  
 
In summary, the principle of enforceable commitments ensures the legitimacy and credibility 




Transparency has been defined as the ‘degree to which trade policies and practices, and the 
process by which they are established, are open and predictable’.87 The principle of 
transparency is part of the WTO’s function to promote fair trade. Companies and individuals 
can make informed decisions on whether or not to take advantage of a business opportunity 
when they have access to a member country’s trade regulations, administrative decisions, and 
trade policies. The WTO has reinforced the principle of transparency by making it a legal 
obligation.88 
  
The WTO also prepares periodic country-specific reports (Trade Policy Reviews) in order to 
promote transparency. This benefits global trade as it prevents member countries from 
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circumventing their commitments under the WTO. Transparency is also useful in removing 
uncertainty regarding foreign trade policy. 
 
e) Safety Valves 
 
The final principle of the MTS is safety valves.89 The WTO appreciates that in certain 
situations governments may need to take action to restrict international trade.  Hoekman 
identified three types of situations when this might occur: 
 
-Situations where trade measures are taken to attain non-economic objectives90;  
-Situations aimed at ensuring fair competition91; and  
-Situations where intervention is necessary for economic reasons92.  
 
In summary, by being a WTO member, each member country agrees to the following set of 
principles: 
i) To avoid discriminating against foreign products at its borders; 
ii) To avoid discriminating against foreign products within its borders;   
iii) To use the principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations; 
iv) To abide by its commitments to the WTO; 
v) To publish all laws including case decisions that will generally affect trade as a 
transparency measure; and 
vi) To take measures, where necessary, to protect its domestic industries.  
 
2.4 SECTION C: AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE VARIOUS 
GATT ROUNDS AND WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES 
 
The Havana Charter focussed primarily on labour law rather than international trade law. 
Even more unfortunately, the charter contained no substantial discussion on agriculture. 
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Agriculture was therefore left to the domain of domestic policy. This section explores the 
negotiations on agriculture under the GATT through the various rounds, and thereafter 
considers the negotiations on agriculture under the WTO. 
 
2.4.1 Negotiations on Agriculture under the GATT 
 
With a membership of 95 countries in 1989, the GATT was a force to be reckoned with.93It 
contained fundamental rules on international trade and a dispute settlement mechanism to 
enforce its rules. However, the GATT’s failure to address trade distorting practices negatively 
impacted agriculture.94 
 
For example, Article XI of the GATT allowed governments to restrict foreign products that 
competed with domestic products. This resulted in governments using tariffs and quotas to 
restrict the quantity of foreign goods. In addition, Article XVI of the GATT allowed 
governments to provide subsidies to their farmers. This resulted in trade imbalances where 
subsidising nations had an unfair advantage over those that could not afford to subsidise their 
farmers. Therefore despite GATT’s large membership, it failed to effectively regulate 
agriculture in both developed and developing nations.  
 
The objective of the GATT was to reduce trade barriers and improve the conditions of 
international trade.95 In order to achieve this, it provided for negotiating rounds where 
members could share their views on trade liberalisation. There were nine rounds of trade 
negotiations.96 
 
Having introduced the GATT, this section now turns to negotiations on agriculture within the 
GATT framework. It is important to note that during the first three negotiation rounds, the 
focus was on liberalising the manufacturing industry.97 This meant that agriculture was 
largely left to domestic regulation. 
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Geneva Round, 1947 
 
This first round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Geneva and began in 
April 1947.98 In addition to the signing of the GATT 1947, negotiations at this round centred 
on the reduction of tariffs through the principle of the Supplier Rule.99 This states that 
concessions may be granted if a member country that supplies the largest part of the product 
makes a request for a tariff reduction.100 At the end of the round, a total of 45 000 
concessions had been granted.  
 
Annecy Round, 1949  
 
This second round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Annecy101 and 
began in April 1949.102 In addition to tariff reductions, this round facilitated the accession of 
new member countries.  
 
Torquay Round, 1950  
 
This third round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Torquay103.104 A total 
of 38 member countries participated and over 8 700 tariff concessions were approved.105 
 
Geneva Round, 1956 to 1959 
 
This fourth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Geneva.106 It is 
estimated that $2.5 billion worth of concessions were approved under the GATT at this 
round.107An important event during this round was the formation of the Common 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The 
CAP’s objective was to protect the EEC’s domestic agricultural industry through the use of 
tariffs and promote its agricultural products through the use of farm subsidies.108 
 
Dillon Round, 1960 to 1962 
 
This fifth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations also took place in Geneva and began 
in September 1960.109 This round is known as the Dillon round because Mr Douglas Dillon, 
former US Treasury Secretary, proposed its formation.110 An estimated $4.9 billion worth of 
concessions were approved under the GATT at this round.111 
 
During the Dillon Round, the USA argued for the disbandment of the EEC’s CAP, as it 
claimed that the policy fell short of the rules agreed upon in GATT.112 Eventually, however, 
the USA accepted the policy.  
 
Kennedy Round, 1963 to 1967  
 
This sixth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Geneva and began in 
May 1963.113 This round is named after former US President, John F Kennedy.114 It followed 
the passing of the USA Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which gave the government the power 
to negotiate international trade rules. During the Kennedy Round progress was made in 
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Tokyo Round, 1973 to 1979 
 
This seventh round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in Tokyo and began in 
September 1973.116 A total of 102 member countries participated and over 8 700 tariff 
concessions were approved under the GATT.117 During the Tokyo Round agriculture 
received unprecedented attention. For the first time, members agreed that agriculture should 
receive equal treatment.118 Furthermore, the USA proposed a set of agricultural trade reforms 
to convert non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents.119 The EU argued against such major trade 
reforms in agriculture to defend its CAP. In the end, the EU won a procedural vote. This 
meant that the CAP was safe until the next round of GATT negotiations. 
 
Uruguay Round, 1986 to 1994 
 
This eighth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations took place in various cities due to 
the length and breadth of negotiations. It began in Uruguay in September 1986, and continued 
in Geneva, Brussels, Washington and Tokyo.120 As a result of its long lifespan it is not 
possible to cover every detail of the agricultural negotiations during this round. This study 
focuses on the five major developments that changed the history of international agricultural 
regulation: i) the Punta del Este Declaration, ii) the main agricultural negotiators during the 
round, iii) the Dunkel Draft, iv) the Blair House Accord, and v) the formation of the AoA.  
 
i) The Punta del Este Declaration 
 
During the 1980s the world experienced rapid fluctuations in food prices. This put pressure 
on countries to address agricultural trade issues. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration in 
1986 reflected this urgency when agriculture was put on the negotiation agenda for the 
Uruguay Round. An important issue was the impact of domestic agricultural policies as 
studies had claimed they had a significant impact on international agricultural trade.121 
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ii) The main agricultural negotiators during the round 
 
During the early GATT years, the main agricultural negotiators were the USA and the EU. 
As discussed above, these two powers had significant domestic agricultural programs in place 
and were wary of trade reforms. During the Uruguay Round, the number of agricultural 
negotiators increased. The list included the USA, the EU, the Cairns Group, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea.122 
 
The US again argued for greater agricultural reform during the Uruguay Round with the EU 
opposing this.123 The EU argued that GATT should be more compatible with its CAP. It also 
voiced concern over wholesale agricultural reform, and campaigned for reform on a 
commodity by commodity basis.124 
 
The Cairns Group’s arguments were similar to those of the USA. The group argued for 
improved market access to developed countries and the reduction of domestic support 
programs.  
 
The Japanese and Koreans, who had strong farmer support programs opposed the Cairns 
Group and the USA’s proposals, and took a position similar to that of the EU. Rice was an 
important agricultural commodity for Japan and Korea and they sought to protect their 
domestic industries from harsh foreign competition. 
 
On the other hand, the developing world hoped for agricultural reform that would offer them 
improved market access. Developing countries argued for special and differential treatment, 
noting that agriculture was the core of their economic development, and that new 














iii) Dunkel Draft 
Following the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986, the next important breakthrough was 
the 1988 mid-term review in Montreal. The review revealed that parties were deadlocked on 
agriculture reforms. However the deadlock was finally broken in April 1989 by the Geneva 
Accord. This introduced a number of short term measures, including a freeze on domestic 
support, export subsidies and border protection.  
 
Due to its commitment to the CAP, the EU opposed reform in these three key areas, 
particularly export subsidies. Negotiations nonetheless proceeded in the hope that an 
agreement could be reach by December 1990. This deadline came and went as the EU once 
again rejected the draft agreement.126 This demonstrates the complexity of MTS negotiations. 
 
Finally, in 1991 all parties agreed to liberalise the three main areas of international 
agricultural trade. With this common vision in mind, the next goal was to establish the level 
of specific concessions that each country would make. This required further negotiation and 
two years passed before any agreement was reached.127 
 
In 1991, the Dunkel Draft was finally produced, with the expectation of concluding the 
Uruguay Round. This included quantitative measures with respect to concessions in each of 
the three major agricultural areas. Unfortunately within three days, the EU rejected the 
Dunkel Draft claiming that it should be‘re-negotiated’.128 No specific reasons were given. 
The following year, the EU unexpectedly revised its CAP to bring it closer to what was 
negotiated in the Dunkel Draft. This led to the development of the Blair House Accord. 
 
iv) Blair House Accord 
Once the EU had reformed its CAP, the USA sought bilateral negotiations with the EU in the 
hope that all three major areas could be successfully negotiated. This led to the development 
of the Blair House Accord129. The primary objective of this Accord was to amend the Dunkel 
Draft.  
 








These amendments, which are now in the Final Agreement, included the following:  
 ‘the volume of subsidized exports be reduced to 21 percent from the original proposal 
of 24 per cent;  
 the base period used for establishing the baseline from which export subsidies would 
be cut was made more flexible, and had the effect of initially raising the level of 
permitted export subsidies; 
 direct income payments made under production limiting programmes such as EU's 
scheme under the reformed CAP and the USA's deficiency payments were made 
exempt from domestic support reduction commitments; and 
 commitments to reduce domestic support on a product-by-product basis were 
replaced by a commitment to reduce overall support to the agricultural sector.’130 
 
v) Formation of the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
The Blair House Accord facilitated the eventual conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993 
with all parties reaching agreement. The AoA became an annexure to the main agreement 
establishing the WTO. After 46 years, agriculture had its first taste of trade liberalisation. 
However, this was simply a ‘taste’ as the Agreement still allowed for the use of domestic and 
export subsidies. 
 
The formation of the WTO and its AoA in 1995 led to many changes in agriculture 
regulation. The following section discusses the history and development of international 
agriculture regulation under the WTO.  
 
2.4.2 Negotiations on Agriculture under the WTO 
 
Article 20 of the AoA131 is the first point to consider in discussing the role of agriculture 
negotiations under the WTO. It is important because it appreciates that agricultural trade 
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liberalisation is an on-going process that enables continued negotiation in order to reform this 
sector.  
 
Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference, 1996 
 
The WTO scheduled the first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996.132 Four issues 
were highlighted: i) government procurement, ii) trade facilitation, iii) trade and investment 
and iv) trade and competition.133 Together these are referred to as the ‘Singapore Issues’.134 
During trade negotiations, developing countries argued that the Singapore Issues favoured 
developed countries.135 This led to the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999.  
 
Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference, 1999 
 
As discussed above, the Singapore Issues led to the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference in 1999.136  
 
GATT Doha Round, 2001 
 
During January 2000 the WTO appointed its Agriculture Committee to head up the Doha 
Round of trade reform.137 The first agriculture meeting under the WTO took place on 23 and 
24 March, 2000. The Committee received 45 agriculture proposals from interested countries. 
These reflected each country’s position on issues identified in earlier negotiations. Once the 
proposals were received, further negotiations took place to find common ground between the 
parties. 
 
The 2001 Ministerial Conference took place in Doha, Qatar. The AoA has identified 
agricultural reforms in three main areas: i) to improve market access to developed countries, 
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ii) to reduce domestic support and iii) to reduce farm subsidies. The Doha negotiations have 
therefore centred on these areas of agricultural reform.138 This round is yet to be completed.  
 
It should be noted that during the earlier Uruguay Round, the USA, EU and the Cairns Group 
were the main parties in agriculture negotiations. This changed during the Doha Round. 
There was a political ‘revival’ within the WTO as more developing countries took the 
initiative to participate in agriculture negotiations. As Tancu notes ‘developing countries are 
well organized; they know what they need and what to ask for in exchange of their support in 
certain areas’.139  
 
Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference, 2003 
 
At the Cancun Conference in 2005, some member countries formed partnerships to 
strengthen their position in the agriculture negotiations. The EU and the USA collaborated 
while other members chose to make their own submissions.140 The immediate impact of this 
partnership was that, as WTO spokesperson, Keith Rockwell noted, it ‘galvanized the process 
in a way that we have not seen in three-and-a-half years of agriculture negotiations’.141 
Indeed, this partnership was reminiscent of the Blair House Accord during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations. 
 
This prompted other WTO members to form their own coalitions. Brazil, India, China and 20 
other developing countries came together, to strengthen their proposals on reducing export 
subsidies and increasing market access. This group was referred to as the ‘G20 countries’ and 
they submitted joint proposals.142 
 
Despite the new draft declaration known as the ‘Derbez text’, the Cancun negotiations did not 
yield success in terms of agricultural liberalisation.143 On the contrary, countries 
acknowledged that the Cancun Ministerial Conference resulted in a deadlock. This was not 
the first time this had happened during multilateral negotiations and will probably not be the 
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last.144 The Uruguay Round also reached a deadlock, and this was the same round that in the 
end produced the AoA.145 Therefore it could be argued that deadlocks are a typical 
consequence of the WTO negotiation process that are often broken with time and further 
negotiations.  
 
True to form, the Cancun deadlock broke in July 2004. The parties approved a package of 
agreements that would be used to establish the modalities in agriculture.146 This was referred 
to as the ‘July package’147 while the official WTO document called it the ‘August 
Framework’ as it was ‘promulgated’ by the WTO in August 2004.148 The August Framework 
contained the Modalities in Agriculture, and established when the next Ministerial 
Conference would take place.  
 
Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, 2005 
 
At the subsequent Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in 2005, members decided that 
the next goal was to agree on formulas that would determine the scale of reduction in 
agricultural tariffs and on farm subsidies.149 However members could not reach agreement.  
 
A deadline to complete negotiations on agriculture was set for January 2005. Due to the 
consensus-building style of WTO negotiations, deadlines are seldom met. This was the case 
for agriculture, as member countries could not agree and a new deadline was set.  
 
Negotiations from 2006 to 2008 
 
In July 2006 another deadlock was reached. The negotiators did not even manage to produce 
a draft.150 Members attempted to break the deadlock in July 2007.151 Chairperson Falconer 
presented a revised draft on the modalities.152 Some member countries believed that this draft 













did not reflect their interests.153 As a result, the Chairperson announced a three-week 
schedule of intensive negotiations in order to iron out any differences and to at least produce 
a draft for consideration.154 A revised draft on modalities was eventually produced that was 
the result of a series of meetings in Geneva. This is known as the ‘July 2008 Package’.155 
 
During 2008, the major agricultural reports centred on the stalemate between the USA and 
India on the use of the Special Safeguard Mechanism on agriculture.156 This Mechanism 
essentially allows countries to raise tariffs in response to surges in imported agricultural 
products. India sought to protect its local industry by proposing the unlimited use of the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism.  However, the USA was concerned that India’s proposal 
might result in increased tariffs beyond the levels agreed in Uruguay. 
 
The Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture noted the following reasons for this 
stalemate: 
 
‘It is perhaps worth underlining that such differences were not some purely technical matter. 
Of course, like all fundamental political differences, there are consequent technical 
differences, but the impasse was not technical. It was political. The fundamental issues were, 
on the one hand, whether you can breach pre-Doha bound rates and, if so, on what terms and 
conditions and, on the other hand, how you can make a SSM mechanism genuinely 
operational for developing country Members if there is an a priori ceiling constraint of such a 
kind. These issues remained-as they have throughout the negotiations - substantive, and 
essentially political, divisions. SSM was always going to be one of the three or four potential 
deal-breaker items and so, alas, it proved to be.’157 
 
Negotiations in 2008 lead to revised draft modalities. This was the result of the most 
intensive phase of negotiations the Doha Round had ever seen.158 The revised draft contains 
figures in square brackets, signifying that these have not yet been agreed to.159 Having drafted 
and revised the modalities for agriculture, the next step was to schedule a Ministerial 
Conference.  












Geneva WTO Ministerial Conference, 2009 
 
The next Ministerial Conference took place in Geneva from 30 November to 2 December 
2009. The theme was ‘The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global 
Economic Environment’.160 The Director-General, Mr Pascal Lamy stated that the objective 
was to review the functioning of the WTO on the major issues confronting it.161 These 
included ‘monitoring and surveillance to disputes, accessions, Aid for Trade, technical 
assistance and international governance.162 The deadline for the conclusion of the Doha 
Round was set at 2010. 
 
Geneva WTO Ministerial Conference, 2011 
 
At this Ministerial Conference, member countries agreed that the draft modalities of 
December 2008 should remain the basis for future agriculture negotiations. However in 2011, 
Mr Lamy declared the Doha Round effectively dead.163 Despite this comment, Panagariya 
has argued that there is still hope for the Doha Round because none of the member countries 
have withdrawn from the talks.164 
 
Bali WTO Ministerial Conference, 2013 
 
The next phase of agricultural negotiations took place at the ninth Ministerial Conference in 
Bali. The focus of this Conference was to obtain agreement on a range of specific issues. 
Chapter five of this study critically analyses the outcome of the Bali Conference and outlines 
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This chapter has shown that, in the early GATT years agriculture was left to domestic 
regulation by member countries which created imbalances in agricultural trade and 
fluctuations in food prices. However during the Tokyo Round of negotiations, countries 
recognized the need for effective international agricultural regulation. The Uruguay Round 
delivered this by producing a much needed AoA which covered market access, domestic 
support and export subsidies.  
 
Article 20 of the AoA promotes continued negotiations in this sector. This prompted 
agriculture negotiations during the Doha Round. The Doha Round began in 2000 and should 
have been concluded by now, but due to disagreements between members, talks are still in 
progress. WTO Members are now negotiating the revised draft modalities from December 
2008. Similar to the stalemates at Uruguay and Cancun, there is hope that the Doha Round 
will eventually be concluded. 
 
This study notes that agriculture trade deals are mainly brokered by developed countries like 
the USA and the EU. As a result, agriculture is a politically sensitive industry and issues such 
as food security and rural development are key priorities for both developed and developing 
nations, respectively. Despite the AoA, this thesis submits that agriculture has not witnessed 
the same level of trade reform as other industries. This supports Desta’s observation that: 
 
‘although the Agreement (on Agriculture) certainly represents a significant 
breakthrough in the history of international trade regulation, it is also possible to say 
that the same Agreement is a standing symbol of continued failure to integrate 








                                               






CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSES OF THE AGREEMENT ON 
AGRICULTURE 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) came into being at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round in January 1995.166 Its long-term objective is to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system.167 In order to achieve this, the AoA focuses on three main 
elements of agricultural reform: 
 improving global market access,  
 reduced domestic support, and  
 eliminating export subsidies. 
 
These areas were intended to redress the flaws that existed under GATT.168 As discussed in 
chapter two, this resulted in agricultural trade distortions and fluctuations in world food 
prices. 
 
This chapter address two of the study’s research objectives: a) critically examine the core 
components of the AoA; and b) investigate and examine positive views and criticisms of the 
AoA. In order to achieve these objectives, this chapter is divided into three sections: 
 
i) Section A presents a comprehensive legal analysis of the three main areas of 
agricultural reform, namely, market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies; 
ii) Section B considers the relationship between the AoA and other WTO 
agreements. The WTO agreements discussed under this section include the 
GATT, GATS169, SPS170, and TBT171Agreements; and 
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iii) Section C critically discusses positive views and criticisms of the AoA. As the 
only sector-specific agreement of the WTO, the AoA is subject to some 
controversy. While some172 believe that it has made a positive difference for WTO 
members, others173 believe that the AoA promotes inequality between developed 
and developing countries. This section examines various opinions from the 
perspective of developing countries.  
 
This chapter paints a picture of the main reform elements of the AoA. The critical analysis of 
the AoA lays the foundation for chapter 4 that examines the AoA in the context of the South 
African agricultural industry, and BRICS. 
 
3.2 SECTION A: MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
 
3.2.1 Market Access  
 
Market access refers to the ease or difficulty with which foreign products can be imported 
into a country.174 It is the result of government policy. In other words, a government could 
choose to restrict market access by imposing high tariffs or employing non-tariff barriers. As 
discussed in chapter one, governments may do so in order to shield their domestic industries 
from foreign competition; this is known as protectionism.  
 
The measures a government could employ to restrict market access include inter alia the 
following: 
a) Tariffs- a tax imposed on an imported agricultural product which is added on to 
the selling price. This raises the price of the imported agricultural product, thereby 
making it less attractive to the consumer175; 
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b) Quantitative restrictions- a policy that limits the quantity of agricultural products 
that can be imported into a country. This restricts market access because only a 
limited quantity of foreign products are sold on the domestic market176; and 
c) Standards- specific criteria which an agricultural product must meet before it can 
be imported into a country. The Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement is an 
example of such ‘standards’ as it imposes health and safety requirements for 
imported products. 
As noted earlier, the AoA’s long-term objective is ‘to establish a fair and market oriented 
agricultural trading system’. By implication, the Agreement aims to foster and encourage 
international agricultural trade by improving market access and removing the barriers that 
hamper trade. However Glipo argued that developed countries have asked for improved 
market access to developing countries, without a reciprocal opening up of their 
markets.177This thesis submits that the AoA is quite clear in its purpose: to establish a fair, 
market orientated system; thus, the AoA itself cannot justify the position held by Glipo. 
i) Market Access in terms of the AoA 
 
Market access is defined as the conditions or tariff and non-tariff measures, agreed to by 
members for the entry of specific goods into their domestic markets.178 In other words, 
market access is government policy that regulates the import of foreign goods. In order to 
improve market access, the AoA provides the following: 
Article 4.1: Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and 
reductions of tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein; 
Article 4.2:  Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the 
kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as 
otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5. 
 
                                               
176World Trade Organisation ‘QR’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm, 
accessed on 20 October 2014. 
177A Glipo ‘The WTO-AoA: Impact on Farmers and Rural Women in Asia’ (2003) Asia-Pacific Network for 
Food Sovereignty,3. 
178World Trade Organisation ‘Market Access’ available at 




In order to understand these two articles, it is necessary to examine the context at the time the 
AoA came into effect. As discussed in chapter two, the AoA took effect at the end of the 
Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations. Prior to this, many countries had resorted to non-tariff 
barriers to protect their agricultural sectors from foreign competition.179 The impact of these 
non-tariff barriers were noted by the WTO: 
‘The result of all this (non-tariff barriers) was a proliferation of impediments to agricultural 
trade, including by means of import bans, quotas setting the maximum level of imports, 
variable import levies, minimum import prices and non-tariff measures maintained by state 
trading enterprises. Major agricultural products such as cereals, meat, dairy products, sugar 
and a range of fruits and vegetables have faced barriers to trade on a scale uncommon in other 
merchandise sectors.’180 
 
Non-tariff barriers were a major impediment to improved market access. This resulted in 
increased efforts to eliminate such barriers during the Uruguay Round. The result of these 
negotiations was a process referred to as ‘tariffication’. 
 
Tariffication is a process where pre-existing non-tariff barriers are converted into tariff 
equivalents.181 In other words, if a member country had import quotas (non-tariff barrier) on 
products, these were converted into a form of tariff that could be paid by importers.182 The 
benefit of tariffication was that importers could import products without facing any non-tariff 
barriers. 
 
The AoA itself does not provide any specific details on tariffication. The process was set out 
in a document entitled ‘Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments 
under the Reform Programme’.183 In terms of this document, the first step required of all 
Uruguay Round members was to tariffy their agricultural tariff lines by converting all non-
tariff barriers into simple tariffs.184 The conversion was calculated as the difference between 
the average domestic price and the average world market price.185 However the calculation 
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was complex as it was not easy to determine what the world market price or domestic market 
price was at the time, how these prices should be measured and over what period the 
measurement should take place.186 
 
Once the process of tariffication was complete, the second step was tariff reduction.187 The 
Uruguay Round Modalities Agreement established different rules for different agricultural 
products and set minimum tariff reduction requirements at two levels: the level of individual 
tariff lines; and the overall averages for all agricultural products to be implemented over a 
six-year implementation period commencing in 1995.188 WTO Members agreed to reduce 
tariffs over time starting on the date of the coming into effect of the Marrakesh Agreement in 
1995.189 Developed countries agreed to reduce their tariffs on agricultural products by an 
average 36 per cent over six years, with a minimum of 15 per cent for any product.190 For 
developing countries, the cuts were 24 and 10 per cent, respectively, to be implemented over 
a longer period of ten years.191 Least-developed countries were not required to undertake any 
tariff reductions.192 These tariff reductions were fixed at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and are set out in each WTO Member’s Country Schedule.193 
 
In addition to tariffs, the Modalities document194 addressed the issue of special safeguard 
measures in agriculture.195 These are measures that WTO Members can take in order to 
protect their domestic industries from injury caused by cheap imports.196 This is achieved by 
means of an additional tariff that is imposed on products marked with the ‘SSG’ symbol in a 
country member's schedule.197 
 
However, certain criteria must be met to impose the additional tariff. These are based on two 
potential scenarios. The additional tariff can be imposed if: 
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i) there is surge in the volume of imports of the SSG marked product (volume 
trigger); or 
ii) the price of the SSG marked product falls below a specified reference price (price 
trigger).198 
 
Importantly, article 5 of the AoA does not require any proof of injury as is required under 
normal GATT rules.199 This means that a country can impose the additional tariff under either 
of the above scenarios. Because of this uncertainty, member countries such as the United 
States of America (USA) and the Cairns Group have proposed that special safeguard 
measures be removed from the AoA.200 However Japan and the European Union (EU) have 
argued against such removal due to their products being marked with the ‘SSG’ symbol.201 
 
ii) The Role of Country Schedules in Market Access 
 
Once each member had undergone the tariffication and calculated their reduction 
commitments, these figures had to be inserted into their draft Country Schedules.202 If 
another WTO Member did not object to the figures in the draft Country Schedules by the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round on 15 April 1994, they were incorporated into the final 
Schedules.203 The significance of the final Country Schedules was reflected in the Korea – 
Various Measures on Beef decision.204 In essence this decision stated that a country’s 
Schedule demonstrates its commitment to the WTO, and the document is thus considered to 
have international legal status.205 Therefore the final Country Schedules underline a member 
country’s legal commitments to the WTO. 
 
Once the Country Schedules were finalised, WTO Members further agreed to ‘bind’ their 
tariffs. In other words, they could not impose higher tariffs than those agreed in their 
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Schedule.206 However these ‘bound’ tariffs may be amended at a later stage. If a country 
decides to raise its ‘bound’ tariffs, the principle of reciprocity must be considered. If, for 
example, South Africa chooses to raise its bound tariffs on avocados, it must lower its tariff 
on another product in order to ensure that the principle of give and take is maintained.    
 
The second element of agricultural reform is domestic support. 
 
3.2.2 Domestic Support 
 
Domestic support can be defined as government ‘subsidies and other programmes, including 
those that raise or guarantee farm gate prices and farmers’ incomes’.207 In other words, it is 
the level of support a government provides to its farmers in order to raise or guarantee their 
income. The amount of domestic support a government can offer depends on available 
resources. It is for this reason that the WTO has regulated domestic support in order to ensure 
that international trade is not distorted in favour of countries that can afford to provide 
domestic support. Many have argued208 that the AoA has failed to regulate domestic support 
due to the fact that it still exists. This is discussed in section C below. 
 
The AoA domestic support measures can be grouped into three distinct categories based on 
their impact on agricultural trade and production: 
 
i) The first category includes forms of domestic support that have a direct impact on 
trade and production.209These measures are subject to reduction commitments by 
WTO members. This form of domestic support is referred as ‘amber box’ support. 
It is expressed in numerical terms as the ‘total aggregate measure of support’.210 
This involves calculating a country’s total amber box support into one composite 
figure;211 
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ii) The second category includes forms of domestic support that also have a direct 
impact on trade and production. However the difference is that farmers that 
receive these forms of domestic support are expected to limit their agricultural 
production in exchange for support.212 Because production is limited, domestic 
support measures in this category are permitted by the WTO. These are called 
‘blue box’ support measures;213 
 
iii) The final category includes forms of domestic support that have minimal direct 
impact on trade and production214 and are therefore permitted by the WTO. These 
are referred to as ‘green box’ support measures.215 
 
Articles 6 and 7 of the AoA regulate the use of domestic support. Both categorise domestic 
support into the three categories discussed above: i) permitted domestic support (green box 
measures), ii) domestic support subject to reduction commitments (amber box measures) and 
iii) domestic support with production limiting programmes (blue box measures).216 As noted 
previously, the WTO allows green and blue box measures because they are deemed to have 
minimal impact on trade and production in comparison with amber box measures. However, 
there are requirements for a measure to qualify as green box or blue box.  
 
i) Requirements for Green Box Domestic Support 
 
The importance of green box measures is that the WTO recognises that these measures have 
minimal direct impact on agricultural trade and production. As a result, any measure that is 
deemed a green box measure cannot be challenged before the WTO.  
 
The United Nations (UN) has identified the following two requirements for domestic support 
to qualify as a green box measure: 
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i) ‘the support must be provided through a publicly funded government programme, not 
involving a transfer from consumers; and 
ii) the support may not have the effect of providing price support to producers.’217 
 
In addition to these requirements, annexure 2 of the AoA provides a non-exhaustive list of 
accepted green box measures.218 However, even though a measure may be listed under 
annexure 2, it may still have to fulfil further criteria for that particular nature of that measure 
which are set out in the annexure.219 
 
ii) Requirements For Blue Box Domestic Support 
 
The importance of blue box measures is that the WTO conditionally permits these measures 
as long as production limiting programmes are also in place.220Although blue box measures 
are permitted under the AoA, the UN submits that such measures may still be challenged 
under the WTO for distorting trade.221 
 
The UN has identified the following criteria in order for a measure to qualify as a blue box 
measure: 
 
i) ‘payments are directly paid out from the government budget to the producers; 
(and) 
ii) payments are conditional upon some form of production-limiting requirement 
imposed on the recipient of the support, which include: 
a. payments based on fixed area and yields, or 
b. payments made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; 
c. livestock payments made on a fixed number of head.’222 
 
Glipo argues that blue box measures facilitate the manipulation of domestic support 
commitments.223 Glipo accuses developed countries such as the USA and EU of manipulating 
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prohibited amber box domestic support into acceptable blue box domestic support.224 The 
basis of Glipo’s argument is the fact that spending on blue box measures has increased 
considerably since the introduction of the AoA: ‘thus, while subsidies under the AMS (amber 
box) decreased, there was a corresponding increase in subsidies under the green and blue 
boxes.’225 Glipo does not raise any arguments besides this single statement.226 This thesis 
disagrees with Glipo’s viewpoint due to the fact that a mere increase in blue box support by 
developed countries does not imply manipulation on their part, since the AoA does not place 
a limit on the level of permissible blue box support. Therefore Glipo’s argument that a mere 
increase in blue box domestic support, with a decrease in amber box support, implies 
manipulation by developed countries could be invalid, based on the fact that it is not 
outlawed by the AoA. 
 
iii) Requirements for Amber Box Domestic Support 
 
Amber box measures are not prohibited by the WTO, but are subject to reduction 
commitments by members.227 This means that amber box measures may be challenged before 
the WTO if a country can prove that its trade has been distorted.228 Domestic support 
measures which do not fall in either the green or blue box categories are automatically 
considered amber box measures.  
 
Article 6 of the AoA requires developed countries to reduce their total aggregate measure of 
support by 20 per cent over a six-year period, while developing countries are required to 
reduce their total aggregate measure of support by 13.3 per cent over a ten-year period.  
 
Opportunities for domestic support are also provided to developing countries by means of 
article 6.2. This allows developing countries to use domestic support measures to promote 
rural development which of special relevance to least-developed countries. In other words 
developing countries are permitted to provide: 
i) agricultural investment subsidies,  
ii) support to low-income or resource-poor farmers, and 









iii) support to prevent domestic farmers from growing illicit narcotic crops.229 
 
Having thoroughly analysed domestic support under the AoA, the focus now turns to the 
remaining main area of the AoA, export subsidies.  
 
3.2.3 Export Subsidies  
 
Export subsidies are financial incentives provided by governments to domestic farmers in 
order to develop and encourage an increase in agricultural exports.230 The level of subsidies 
depends on available resources.231As noted previously, the WTO has regulated export 
subsidies in order to ensure that international trade is not distorted in favour of countries that 
can afford to offer their farmers export subsidies. 
 
Chapter two highlighted that the GATT permitted member countries to provide export 
subsidies to their domestic farmers to export agricultural products. The only restriction under 
the GATT was that members should ensure that their export subsidies did not result in their 
country ‘having more than an equitable share of world trade.’232 This changed under the 
WTO regime. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures233(SCM) prohibits 
all forms of export subsidies.234 However, as an exception to the SCM Agreement, export 
subsidies are still permitted under the AoA.235 
 
It is important to note that the AoA does not actually define the term ‘subsidy’. One has to 
refer to the SCM Agreement that is the only WTO agreement that defines this term.236 The 
Agreement defines a subsidy as ‘a financial contribution made by a government or any public 
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body conferring a benefit on the recipient’.237 This is a broad definition and terms such as 
‘benefit’ and ‘recipient’ are subject to interpretation.  
 
In the Canada - Dairy case238 the panel established the link between the application of the 
AoA and the definition of ‘subsidy’ under the SCM Agreement. It found that in order for a 
subsidy to qualify under the AoA, it must first be demonstrated that the subsidy in question 
fits the definition of ‘subsidy’ in the SCM Agreement.239 Once this has been determined, the 
next step is to determine whether the subsidy in question is subject to reduction commitments 
under the AoA.  
 
Article 9.1 of the AoA lists the export subsidies that are subject to reduction commitments.240  
These commitments are based on reducing the amount of products that receive export 
subsidies, and the overall budget for export subsidies. The base period for the calculation was 
1986 to 1990241: 
 
 Developed countries were required to reduce the amount of money they spend on 
export subsidies by 36 per cent242, and the quantity of subsidised products exported by 
21 per cent;243 
 Developing countries were required to reduce the amount of money they spend on 
export subsidies by 24 per cent244, and the quantity of subsidised products exported by 
14 per cent;245 
 Least-developed countries were not obliged to make any reduction commitments.246 
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Article 9 is also significant because it prohibits the use of further export subsidies. In other 
words the only export subsidies applicable are those that were in place between 1986 and 
1990.247 Twenty-five WTO countries, including South Africa248 had export subsidies in place 
during that period. Therefore, only these 25 members are allowed to use export subsidies as 
long as they abide by their reduction commitments. Article 10 of the AoA imposes the only 
limitation. It states that export subsidies may not be used in a manner that would circumvent 
members’ commitments to the WTO. 
 
Having analysed the main elements of the AoA, this chapter now highlights the relationship 
between the AoA and other WTO Agreements.  
 
3.3 SECTION B: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AoA AND OTHER WTO 
AGREEMENTS 
 
This section briefly compares the AoA and other relevant WTO agreements. Among the 
agreements that relate to the AoA are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
Tariffs (1994), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phyto-Sanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The main 
WTO Agreement is known as the ‘Marrakesh Agreement’.249 This was the foundation for the 
establishment of the WTO. From this main Agreement, four annexures follow:   
 
 Annexure 1- contains the multilateral trade agreements that regulate various aspects 
of international trade;250 
 Annexure 2- provides the mechanism for resolving disputes at the WTO; 
 Annexure 3- contains  a variety of policy reviews in international trade; 
 Annexure 4- contains plurilateral agreements entered into by WTO members.    
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3.3.1 The AoA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 
 
The GATT covers all measures relating to trade in goods and is thus a wider agreement than 
the AoA.251 Article XX (b) of the GATT provides that measures can only be applied if they 
are non-discriminatory in nature.252 This thesis argues that the AoA complements Article XX 
(b), of the GATT as it highlights that its long-term objective is to establish a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system.253 
 
Further Article 21 of the AoA strengthens the relationship between GATT 1994 and itself by 
stating that, ‘The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other multilateral trade agreements in 
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.’ 
Since agricultural products are classified as ‘goods’ for the purposes of international trade, 
they fall under Annexure1A of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement. This is because products that 
are identified as ‘goods’ are regulated by the GATT 1994. Agricultural products are classified 
as ‘goods’; therefore they are regulated by the GATT 1994.   
 
3.3.2 The AoA and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
In the EU Bananas dispute, the WTO panel established found that the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) could also be applied to international trade in agricultural 
products. The EU argued that this was not the case because the restrictions in place did not 
affect trade in services which is required in terms of Article I:1 of the GATS.254 However the 
panel disagreed and stated that there was no legal justification to exclude the EU licensing 
import regime from GATS. In arriving at this conclusion, the panel stated the following 
regarding the applicability of GATS and the AoA: 
 
‘(…) Article I:1 of the GATS provides that ‘[t]his Agreement applies to measures by 
Members affecting trade in services’. In our view, the use of the term ‘affecting’ reflects the 
intent of the drafters to give a broad reach to the GATS. The ordinary meaning of the word 
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‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on’, which indicates a broad scope of 
application. This interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panels that 
the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider in scope than such 
terms as ‘regulating’ or ‘governing.’255 
 
3.3.3 The AoA and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures 
 
With increased awareness of the need for food security and environmental protection, 
consumers are becoming more conscious of the products they consume. As a result, the WTO 
has regulated the minimum levels of quality, health and safety standards expected of 
imported products. These form the basis of the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS) 
Agreement. The purpose is to protect human, animal and plant life and health.256 
 
In order to avoid SPS Measures developing into trade barriers, the SPS Agreement provides 
that WTO members may set their own health and safety standards based on an assessment of 
risks.257 It permits members to impose different SPS requirements on food, animal or plant 
products sourced from different countries, provided that these requirements ‘do not arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions 
prevail’.258 
 
In interpreting the SPS Agreement, one also needs to consider the precautionary principle 
which states that members are allowed to adopt SPS measures on a provisional basis if there 
is insufficient scientific evidence to support such measures.259 The rationale is to mitigate the 
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risk of irreversible damage due to the spread of pests and diseases in the case of trade in 
animals, plants and their products, when limited information is available.260 
 
Furthermore, Article 1.4 of the SPS Agreement261 provides that nothing in the agreement 
shall affect the rights of members under the TBT Agreement with regard to measures that fall 
within the scope of that Agreement.262 In other words the SPS and TBT Agreements are 
mutually exclusive; they cannot apply to the same measure at the same time.263 
 
Article 14 of the AoA264 provides that members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the 
Application of SPS Measures. Therefore the AoA complements the SPS Agreement.265 
Serwadda submits that, should a conflict arise between the AoA and the SPS Agreement, the 
AoA will prevail.266 However, he does not give any reasons for this submission. 
 
Furthermore, the SPS Agreement encourages the use of international standards to determine 
SPS Measures. International standards can be obtained from the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (food standards), the Office International des Epizooties (animal health 
standards) or the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (plant life). 
These serve as useful guides for health and safety standards, especially those relating to 
agricultural products.  
 
Although this thesis submits that such health and safety standards should incorporate the 
needs of both developing and developed countries. In other words, health and safety 
standards take into account whether or not a member country has the necessary resources to 
meet such standards. By way of example, if the Office International des Epizooties decide to 
raise standards on animal handling during long-distance transport, a feasibility study could be 
conducted to determine how this would impact on trade with developing countries such as 
South Africa and Brazil.      
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3.3.4 The AoA and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
The TBT Agreement provides for regulations and voluntary standards, and procedures to 
ensure that standards are met, save for when they are SPS measures.267 It has been observed 
that the provisions of the TBT Agreement are not as strict as those in the SPS Agreement, as 
member countries can decide which international standards are appropriate for a number of 
other reasons, which are not necessarily found in the SPS Agreement. An example is national 
security.268 
 
Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement specifically provides that the Agreement does not apply to 
SPS measures as defined in the SPS Agreement. Therefore the SPS and TBT Agreements are 
mutually exclusive, in that, they cannot apply at the same time to the same measure.269 The 
difference lies in the fact that the TBT Agreement does not make compliance with 
international standards as mandatory as the SPS Agreement.270 The latter requires the use of 
international standards unless scientific proof is produced which justifies otherwise while the 
former permits countries to use their own standards without the added burden of scientific 
proof.      
 
3.4 SECTION C: POSITIVE VIEWS AND CRITICISMS OF THE AoA 
 
Thus far this chapter has analysed the three reform elements contained in the AoA, and 
considered the relationship between the AoA and other WTO agreements. This section 
presents arguments on the effectiveness of the AoA, beginning with positive views on the 
impact of the AoA, followed by a critique.   
 
3.4.1 Positive Commentary on the Impact of the AoA 
 
The single most positive comment on the AoA is the fact that it recognised the importance of 
agriculture and brought it into the fold of the multilateral trading system.271 International 
agricultural trade is now subject to WTO negotiations and reform packages. Considering the 
                                               
267Serwadda (note 251 above) 15. 
268Ibid 15. 
269Ibid 15. 
270O’Connor (note 184 above) 79. 




lack of adequate recognition under the GATT, this had a significant impact on global 
agriculture.   
 
The literature on the impact of the AoA is by and large negative. However Grant and Boys 
argued that the AoA made a positive difference to WTO members’ agricultural trade.272 They 
applied an economic formula to calculate inter alia members’ agricultural trade statistics 
based on accession to the GATT and WTO. Their findings demonstrate that membership of 
the GATT and WTO increased members’ agricultural trade by an average 161 per cent.273 
 
Grant and Boys attribute this high percentage to the following: 
 
a) Trade procedures reduce uncertainty in international transactions274;  
b) Trade rules bring about transparency of members’ trade policies275; 
c) Avoidance of discriminatory trade between members276; and 
d) The WTO facilitates trade coordination and, in so doing, provides clear incentives 
for members to invest in trading relationships.277 
 
Grant and Boys further argue that, 
 
‘Agricultural trade is often at the forefront of multilateral trade negotiations, and the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) is no exception. Yet if the GATT/WTO has been unable to 
solve the problem of agricultural protection, why does membership yield such tantalizing 
benefits? Several possible explanations exist. First, since the 1980s many developing 
countries have progressively reduced their own agricultural export taxes. While this domestic 
policy change was not a function of GATT/WTO membership, it is possible that membership 
made nations more disposed, in general, to undertake trade reform. Second, the assumption 
that membership promotes trade through tariff cuts alone misses other channels through 
which the multilateral organization has an impact. The GATT/WTO establishes procedures 
that reduce uncertainty in international transactions, makes rules that exemplify transparency 
among members about their trade policies, and provides legal means to circumvent 
                                               









discriminatory action. Membership also gives governments the power to oppose pressure 
from domestic interests who are resistant to their borders opening to further imports.’278 
 
They conclude that, ‘Despite all the rancor and roadblocks in the reform of observable 
agricultural policies, participation in the GATT/WTO still yields big rewards’.279 
 
Nonetheless, Grant and Boys acknowledged that the WTO has failed to lower tariffs in the 
agricultural sector. They note that, ‘The initial results support the claim that membership in 
the GATT/WTO has delivered significant positive effects on members’ AG trade even if it 
has failed to lower tariffs in this sector to any substantial degree’.280 
 
This thesis questions the 161 per cent gain found by Grant and Boys as this is the average 
increase281among all WTO members. It does not clarify whether developed country members 
or developing country members experienced this increase in agricultural trade. Furthermore, 
Grant and Boys do not adequately address the issue of agriculture in developing countries. 
They merely note that, ‘Middle and low income developing and least developed economies - 
those that have a vested interest in expanding agricultural exports - gain substantially from 
membership in the GATT/WTO’.282 No further statistics are provided in this regard. 
 
Balding283 and Subramanian284  found that developing members’ total merchandise trade only 
experienced a slight increase in trade flows when compared with non-member countries.285 
Therefore, whilst the WTO and AoA can be praised for bringing agriculture to a trade forum, 
the fact of the matter is that developing countries need to share economic agricultural growth.  
 
3.4.2 Criticism of the Impact of the AoA 
 
Having discussed the positive views of the AoA, this section considers critiques of this 
agreement. Criticism of the AoA can be categorised into: a) criticism relating to the actual 
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provisions of the AoA, and b) criticism directed towards the implementation of the AoA. 
Both are considered with a view to arguing that the AoA has failed to assist developing 
countries. 
 
a) Criticism Relating to the Provisions of the AoA 
 
This section focuses on four major inadequacies relating to the provisions of the AoA. These 
are: i) the failure of the AoA to take different agricultural needs into account; ii) the 
complexity of domestic support provisions; iii) shortfalls in the special safeguard provisions 
and iv) design flaws in the export subsidy provisions. 
 
i) Failure of the AoA to take Different Agricultural Needs into account 
 
It is common knowledge that agricultural needs differ amongst developed and developing 
countries because of the state of each type of economy. In developed countries, the 
agricultural system is export orientated.286 Producers in developed countries generally enter 
this field for commercial reasons. However, research indicates that, in developing countries, 
agriculture is more subsistence based.287 Producers in developing countries enter this field to 
sustain their daily livelihoods. 
 
Bearing these agricultural needs in mind, it has been argued that the AoA has failed to 
accommodate the socio-economic needs of developing countries by adopting a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach.288 For example, the AoA does not allow developing countries the flexibility to 
implement policies consistent with their individual development goals. It merely allows them 
a little more time to implement the agreement.289 
 
The AoA’s failure to recognise that some developing countries have unique needs is well-
illustrated by the case of South Africa. Apartheid prevented many black South Africans from 
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participating in agriculture.290 As a result, they now require support in the form of additional 
funding and training to compete in the international market. However this support may be 
challenged before the WTO as the government would compensate black farmers for their 
participation in agriculture. It could be argued that the direct link between compensation and 
production would constitute ‘amber-box’ domestic support. However as discussed in chapter 
two, many countries such as those in the EU had such domestic support policies under the 
GATT.  
 
ii) Complexity of Domestic Support Provisions 
 
As noted earlier, the AoA categorises domestic support into three boxes, depending on the 
level of trade distortion: amber (prohibited due to high trade distortions), blue (permitted but 
also trade distorting, and hence challengeable) and green (permitted and unchallengeable due 
to low trade distortions). 
 
The blue box is arguably the most contentious.291 This is because such support includes ‘de-
coupled payments’. Thus blue box support is supposedly linked to production limiting 
programmes. In other words, governments ironically support their farmers if they limit 
agricultural production. A simile would be a person receiving a government firearm and 
being given a limited number of bullets; regardless of the number of bullets, a firearm is still 
sponsored. In the same way, regardless of production limiting programmes, at the end of the 
day farmers still receive direct support from government. 
 
Blue box support originated during the Uruguay Round. The EU persuaded other WTO 
members that due to their Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), any reductions in amber box 
support would have a serious impact on their agricultural production.292 Article 6.5 of the 
AoA therefore allows for domestic support if it is tied to production limiting programmes, 
i.e., blue box support. 
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However it has been submitted that due to the highly technical nature and advanced 
administrative requirements of this provision, developing countries simply do not have the 
resources to gain from blue box measures.293 This places them at a significant disadvantage in 
supporting their farmers. The end result is agricultural trade distortions as developed 
countries with access to legal and administrative skills pools can better compete within WTO 
rules.294 
 
iii) Shortfalls of the Special Safeguard Provisions 
 
The research on the use of special safeguards in agriculture has been well summarised by 
ActionAid International.295 In order to provide a concise account, the following paragraph on 
the use of special safeguards in agriculture is reproduced: 
 
‘The special safeguard (SSG) provision was introduced to allow countries to impose 
additional duties in order to protect them from sudden import surges in terms of volumes or 
low prices. However, in order to qualify for SSG, countries had to have non-tariff barriers 
(quantitative restrictions on imports) in place at the time tariffication took place under the 
Uruguay Round. Only 22 developing countries had non-tariff barriers that enabled them to 
qualify. In contrast, 16 developed and eastern European countries qualified. It is pertinent to 
note that out of the total number of SSG products (6072) that are available to all 38 countries, 
only 31.8% products (1930) are available to developing countries as against 68.2 % (4142) to 
developed countries. Of these, the EU can use SSG against 539 products, the US against 189 
products, Canada against 150 products, Australia against 10 products and Switzerland against 
an astounding 961 products.’296 
 
In other words, countries with non-tariff barriers in place during the tariffication process can 
call upon special safeguard measures. Therefore the AoA actually ‘rewarded’ countries for 
their use of non-tariff barriers by giving them the exclusive right to use special safeguard 
measures.297 
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Furthermore, ActionAid has argued that the AoA has failed to consider the countries that 
require special safeguard measures the most, namely, developing countries. Many developing 
countries do not have the option of invoking special safeguard measures, as many did not use 
complex non-tariff barriers prior to the tariffication process. This thesis recommends that the 
WTO Agriculture Committee review this provision and allow special safeguard measures to 
be used by all WTO members, especially developing countries. 
 
iv) Design Flaws in the Export Subsidy Provisions 
 
As indicated above, the AoA provides for the use of export subsidies on condition they are 
subject to reduction commitments. However, only a small number of countries are allowed to 
use export subsidies.298 This is determined by whether or not they provided export subsidies 
during the base period.299 In other words if a country had export subsidies prior to the 
Uruguay Round, they are allowed to continue as long as they abide by their reduction 
commitments.  
 
Countries that did not provide export subsidies during the base period (mostly developing 
countries) are thus barred from providing export subsidies.300 In other words, the provisions 
promote inequity by allowing developed countries to continue providing export subsidies, 
whereas developing countries are barred from doing so. 
 
Recent developments paint a gloomy picture as the USA Congress has approved the USA 
Farm Bill301 which provides for US$175 billion in financial assistance over a period of ten 
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years for domestic farmers.302 This will mainly take the form of guaranteed prices for 
agricultural products produced within the USA.303 Furthermore, in 2002 the EU agreed on 
plans to increase its domestic support programmes from €43 billion to €49 billion by 2013.304 
American and EU agricultural producers therefore have an unfair advantage on the 
international market because they can sell their products at lower prices than other countries 
as their farmers receive guaranteed prices from the government. 
 
As discussed above, a significant disadvantage arises among developing countries because 
they cannot subsidise their exports even if they have the available financial resources. This 
thesis therefore calls for a ban on all export subsidies in the next five years.  
 
Having analysed criticisms of the provisions of the AoA, the focus turns to criticism of the 
implementation of the AoA. 
 
b) Criticism of the Implementation of the AOA 
 
This section argues that the AoA has failed to live up to its main reform provisions. It focuses 
on: i) abuse of food aid, ii) the AoA’s failure to regulate the dumping of agricultural goods, 
and iii) the fact that developing countries are not given an adequate voice in agricultural 
negotiations at the WTO. 
 
i) Abuse Of Food Aid 
 
As discussed above, as two of the largest agricultural exporters amongst developed countries, 
the USA and EU continue to subsidise their farmers.305 The EU has argued that, through the 
distribution of food aid, the USA has manipulated the provisions of the AoA via export 
credits.306 In turn, the USA has criticised the EU for its blatant provision of export subsidies 
through the CAP. 
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Research suggests that food aid does result in international trade distortions.307 Barett found 
that ‘food aid clearly displaces commercial sales of food’ in countries that receive it.308 As 
one of the main distributors of food aid, the USA provides such aid on the basis of its Trade 
and Development Assistance Act.309 This allows the USA to essentially ‘sell’ food aid to 
developing countries under the guise of longer repayment periods310 and below market 
interest rates.311 In other words, food aid is actually sold to developing countries. Kevin 
Watkins of OXFAM concluded ‘In all but name, it (Act) is a subsidised export credit 
program.’312 It is estimated that total food aid based on the Act amounts to $100million per 
year.313 This is in stark contrast to many developing countries that cannot afford to subsidise 
their exports to such an extent. 
 
In addition, Clapp notes that ‘the amounts allocated to different countries do not seem to 
correlate all that closely with need. Some countries which are not in food deficit receive large 
amounts of food aid, while others which are in food deficit receive much less.’314 Clearly 
food aid is not the rosy picture that is portrayed in the media. 
 
Other WTO members are prepared to negotiate major areas of agricultural reform if food aid 
is stopped.315 For example, the EU has argued that the sale of food aid and export subsidies 
have an equally negative impact on global agricultural trade.316 It has indicated that it would 
be prepared to reduce its export subsidies provided the USA cut back on ‘food aid’. The EU 
has proposed that food aid be provided in the form of cash to countries that declare an 
international emergency.317 It remains to be seen whether or not the USA and the EU will 
reach a joint solution or whether the voices of developing countries will rise up to demand 
greater rights under the AoA. 
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ii) Failure of the AoA to Regulate Dumping of Agricultural Goods 
 
Dumping can be defined as exporting agricultural products at a significantly lower price in 
the receiving country, than would be charged in the exporting country.318 The following case 
study further explains the concept and effects of dumping: 
 
Case study 1: The concept and effects of Dumping 
 
 The cost of producing a kilo of apples in South Africa is R50, while the international 
price for a kilo of apples is R40. A South African apple farmer exporting a kilo of 
apples would thus suffer a shortfall of R10. 
 
 In order to promote exports, the government contributes R30 per kilo of apples 
exported from South Africa. 
 
 This means that South African farmers who export apples would receive a total of 
R70 (R40 on the world market plus R30 from the government). 
 
 This yields a guaranteed profit of R20 per kilo (R70 received minus the cost of 
production of R50). 
 
 Because of the guaranteed profit many farms across South Africa decide to produce 
apples for export. The result is a surplus of apple stocks. 
 
 In order to recoup the cost, this surplus stock is sold on the international market at a 
much cheaper price. South African apple farmers sell their apples on international 
markets for R20 per kilo. They still break even as they receive R30 from the 
government (R30) and the actual cost of production is R50. 
 
 Therefore the government subsidy results in farmers selling apples on the 
international market at a significantly lower price (R20), than the price in South 
Africa (R50+). This is referred to as ‘dumping’. 
                                               






Dumping causes many agricultural producers in developing countries to cease operations 
because they cannot compete with artificially cheap imports.319 This is reflected in an account 
by Mr Ayariga, a rice farmer from Ghana:  
‘Rice farming is no longer lucrative because imported rice is cheaper than locally produced 
rice. We cannot make ends meet. The field we used to plant rice in is now lying fallow and 
it’s being used to play football. We are being forced to compete in foreign markets – it’s like 
our under- 20 football team facing Manchester United. Tell me, is this equal? Is this fair? It is 
a big shame to be a farmer now.’320 
 
As a further example, during the 1990s the demand for dairy products increased dramatically 
in the Dominican Republic.321 EU milk powder was an estimated 25 per cent cheaper than 
Dominican milk powder due to the fact that the EU subsidised producers.322 This led to a 
large increase in the volume of subsidised milk powder exported from the EU. Farmers in the 
Dominican Republic could not compete with this cheap imported product and closed down. 
An investigation revealed that EU farmers, in particular the Scandinavian company, ‘Arla 
Foods’ had received an estimated €17.5 million in subsidies.323 
 
In summary the consequences of the AoA’s failure to regulate dumping are felt by 
developing countries due to their inability to compete with cheap subsidised imports. Many 
developing countries simply do not have the financial resources to offer their agricultural 
producers the same level of domestic support. As a result, farmers like Mr Ayariga are driven 
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iii) Developing Countries are not given an Adequate Voice in Agricultural 
Negotiations at the WTO 
 
Article 20 of the AoA324 appreciates that agricultural trade liberalisation is an on-going 
process and provides for continued negotiations to reform this sector. However as noted 
above, the two main powers in agricultural negotiations are the USA and the EU.325 This has 
been the norm for over 60 years, as far back as when the USA refused to ratify the charter of 
the International Trade Organisation and when the EU introduced the CAP to subsidise its 
farmers. The effect of these two ‘superpowers’ on developing countries is observed by Clapp: 
 
‘Developing countries are profoundly affected by these (US and EU) trade battles at the WTO 
... in the WTO's deliberations over agriculture, these (developing) countries in practice have 
little voice, and by and large are at the mercy of the deals brokered between the big 
agricultural players, particularly the US and the EU.’326 
 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the lack of participation by developing countries in 
agricultural negotiations represents a violation of article 20 of the AoA because they do not 
have negotiating power at the WTO to broker deals that would be favourable in comparison 
with their developed counterparts. This reflects the continued marginalisation of developing 




The AoA came into existence at the end of the Uruguay Round. It sought to achieve reform in 
three main areas: to improve market access through the tariffication of non-tariff barriers, to 
reduce the level of amber box domestic support, and to reduce export subsidies. 
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Some important benefits are available to countries after acceding to the AoA. These include 
access to a forum to negotiate agricultural trade rules that did not exist under GATT 1947, 
agreed upon procedures to resolve disputes, the introduction of transparency in members’ 
agricultural policies and continued negotiations on the reform of agricultural trade. 
 
Despite these benefits, this thesis criticises the AoA for its design and implementation issues. 
With regard to design, the thesis argues that the AoA i) failed to take the different agricultural 
needs of its members into account, ii) has complex domestic support provisions; iii) has 
shortfalls in its special safeguard provisions and iv) shows a design flaw in its export subsidy 
provisions. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the AoA has failed to live up to its main reform 
provisions. This chapter focussed on i) how food aid was used to circumvent commitments 
under the AoA, ii) the fact that the dumping of agricultural goods continues and iii) how 
developing countries have been marginalised in agricultural negotiations at the WTO. 
 
Therefore the overall argument of this chapter is that the AoA has failed to assist developing 
countries. This argument is proven by the many criticisms directed at the AoA and by the fact 
that developed countries are allowed to provide export subsidies and amber box domestic 
support to their agricultural producers. In essence this chapter supports Desta’s view that: 
 
‘… whatever governments may say in this respect, the issue about agriculture is one of 
principle. If the multilateral trading system claims to be based on any principle, it is fairness, 
transparency and equal opportunities for all on the basis of the economic law of comparative 
advantage. The current rules of agricultural trade are only an embodiment of sheer hypocrisy 








                                               











As noted in chapter one, South Africa is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and a signatory to its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). It is therefore bound to ensure that its 
municipal laws reflect the principles that govern the WTO and the AoA.328 This chapter 
examines the AoA in the context of the South African agricultural industry, and further 
explores the possible impact of the country’s membership of BRICS on this sector. The 
chapter is divided into three sections: 
 
iv) Section A provides a background to the agricultural industry in South Africa; 
v) Section B presents a detailed discussion of agricultural law and policy in South 
Africa; and 
vi) Section C analyses the possible impact of South Africa’s membership of BRICS 
on the agricultural sector. 
 
To recap, BRICS is the acronym for the economic partnership between Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. The acronym was developed by Goldman Sachs, who forecast that 
the first four developing countries would be major economies by the year 2050.329 This thesis 
submits that South Africa’s membership of BRICS offers significant development potential 
in a number of areas, particularly agriculture. The fact that South Africa was invited to join 
BRIC demonstrates the political statute the country has attained in the international 
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4.2 SECTION A: BACKGROUND TO THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Part one discusses the forms of agriculture found in 
South Africa, and part two explores the unique factors characterising this sector in South 
Africa. 
 
4.2.1   Forms of agriculture found in South Africa 
  
The agricultural industry in South Africa is comprised of field crops, horticulture, livestock, 
forestry and fishing.330 Unlike other countries in Africa, South Africa is considered to be a 
dual agricultural economy.331 This means that the country’s agricultural production derives 
from a mix of commercial and subsistence farmers.332  Commercial farming entails intensive 
crop and livestock production with the objective of realising a profit, whereas subsistence 
farming involves meeting the daily nutritional needs of individuals within a small family 
unit.333 The advantage of a dual agricultural economy is that commercial farmers promote 
trade in agricultural products whilst resource-poor families are able to provide for themselves 
through subsistence farming.  
 
Furthermore, South African farmers produce a wide variety of agricultural products. These 
include maize334, wheat335, barley336, citrus337, avocadoes338, pineapples339, litchis340, and an 
assortment of vegetables and wines.341 South Africa is also a major sugar342 producer and is 
ranked the 13th largest sugar producer in the world.343 
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In addition to crop farming, the South African livestock industry has an estimated population 
of 14 million cattle344 and 29 million sheep345.346 Cattle are especially important in South 
Africa as they are considered symbols of wealth in the local Zulu culture.347 In addition, 
South Africa accounts for 65 per cent of the world’s demand for ostrich products.348 The 
country also produces milk and an estimated 60 000 workers are employed in the dairy 
industry alone.349 
 
South African has also ventured into game farming that entails intensive production of 
valuable game species such as water buffalo and springbok with the intention of realising a 
profit.350 On 1 September 2012, a single buffalo bull was auctioned by a South African 
farmer for R26 million at Bela-Bela.351 The bull, named Horizon, was the most expensive 
game species ever sold in South Africa.352 
 
As noted above, the South African agricultural sector consists of both commercial and 
subsistence farming, with a wide variety of agricultural production. The following section 
examines the unique characteristics of South African agriculture. 
 
4.2.2   Unique characteristics of South African agriculture 
 
Despite the positive picture painted above, South African farmers confront unique challenges 
when compared with their global counterparts. These include government’s policy on land 
redistribution, the prescription of black economic empowerment, minimum wages in the 
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agricultural sector, and the impact of HIV/Aids on the labour force.353 These challenges are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
Due to the discriminatory nature of the apartheid regime, many black South Africans were 
excluded from commercial participation in the agricultural sector.354 The African National 
Congress (ANC)-led government aimed to redress past imbalances by introducing 
agricultural broad-based black economic empowerment (AgriBEE).355 The goal was to 
transfer 30 per cent of commercial agricultural land to previously disadvantaged people by 
2014.356 
 
Faced with the risk of losing their land, many commercial farmers are hesitant to invest 
capital and new technologies in their operations.357 The effect is a decrease in commercial 
production and innovation in the agricultural sector. The ultimate result is that food has to be 
imported to meet basic demand.358 This may result in greater competition within the industry, 
which further impacts domestic farmers.359 
 
Government’s lack of clarity on its BEE policy in the agricultural sector further undermines 
commercial producers’ confidence.360 Ortman remarks that, ‘the outcomes of numerous 
conferences and workshops held in the country indicate that there is still considerable 
uncertainty among stakeholders (such as commercial farmers, organized agriculture, 
commercial banks, NGOs, and even the government) about what AgriBEE entails and how to 
achieve its goals’.361 
 
The minimum wage for farm workers is a further challenge. In the 1980s, farm labourers had 
little protection under the law. Only after 1994 did they fall within the ambit of labour law. 
The Labour Relations Act of 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, Skills 
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Development Act of 1998 and Employment Equity Act of 1998 also apply to farm labourers. 
This led to the introduction of a minimum wage. This is expected to reduce employment on 
farms since the legislated wage is above the market rate.362 The issue of wages came to the 
fore in the Western Cape during 2013 when farm workers went on strike demanding an 
increase in the minimum wage from R69 to R150 a day.363 The strike left three farm workers 
dead and caused R160 million in insurance claims by farmers.364 Ultimately, the Minister of 
Labour, Mildred Oliphant, posted a new sectoral wage determination at R105 a day.365 
However, the strike remains a symbol of the political tension between AgriBEE and large 
scale commercial farming.366 
 
Arndt and Lewis’367 research on the impact of HIV/Aids on the South African labour force 
found that the pandemic has negatively affected productivity and increased production costs 
as employers spend valuable time on recruitment and training.368 Moreover, the impact of 
HIV/Aids on subsistence farmers is considerable as the death of key members creates a 
vacuum in agricultural skills.369 The greater the number of South Africans that die from HIV/ 
Aids the fewer the consumers available to purchase agricultural products.370 In the long term, 
a decrease in demand will result in a decrease in supply, which will force South African 
farmers out of business.371 
 
Having briefly identified the characteristics that are unique to South African agriculture, the 
focus now turns to the policies introduced to address these factors. These policies frame the 
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4.3 SECTION B: AGRICULTURAL LAW AND POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This section is divided into two parts. The first examines the history and development of 
agricultural law and policy in South Africa, while part two investigates the implementation of 
the AoA in South Africa. 
 
4.3.1 History and development of agricultural law and policy in South Africa 
 
This section draws heavily on the work of Ntshephe372, a leading researcher in the field of 
South African agricultural policy. The historical development of agricultural policy is divided 
into two phases: i) pre-deregulation, and ii) deregulation. Each is critically analysed as part of 
the legal development of agriculture in South Africa. 
 
As noted earlier, South African agricultural regulation has undergone many changes. These 
include land reform, minimum wages, the deregulation of agricultural boards, liberalization 
of tariffs, and a reduction in domestic support provided to farmers.373 However, as Soko 
notes, when South Africa signed the Marrakesh Agreement, it sent two messages to the 
world: 1) South Africa was prepared to liberalise its trade policies in accordance with 
international norms, and 2) South Africa sought to establish itself in the world trading 
system.374 
 
Realising these commitments meant that the country (that had been excluded from major 
international spheres) had to undergo particular changes. These are best understood by 
analysing the period from 1937 to 1996, the so called pre-deregulation phase. 
 
i) Pre-Deregulation Phase (1937-1996) 
 
A common global feature during the early stages of this phase was significant state regulation 
of domestic industries, especially agriculture. This can be attributed to the economic 
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uncertainty of the time.375 The world was experiencing the Great Depression, and countries 
had to ensure a stable food supply at reasonable prices. This led to significant regulation of 
the agricultural industry. 
 
During this period South Africa passed legislation that had a major impact on land 
ownership. The Land Act of 1936 divided South African agricultural land according to racial 
groups.376 Black smallholder farmers were allotted 8 per cent in order to engage in 
agricultural production, whilst the remainder was reserved for white commercial farmers.377 
The next major development was the formation of the Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa.378 The bank’s primary function was to finance farmers who could not access regular 
banking services. The Agricultural Credit Board was created later to finance farmers deemed 
to be high-risk. 
 
The first significant piece of South African legislation governing agriculture was the 
Marketing Act of 1937. The Act sought to robustly regulate market access to South African 
agricultural products through forms of state protectionism. The Act arose from the 
recommendations of the Viljoen Committee379 that ‘argued that the inelastic demand for farm 
products, including livestock, the adverse climate in South Africa, the lack of information and 
the risks inherent to a free market justified state intervention.’380 
 
Furthermore, the Viljoen Committee believed ‘that the agricultural problem had become too 
complicated to be handled by thousands of ill-organised and financially weak individuals 
with conflicting interests. With respect to pricing, the committee could not see why this could 
not be done equally well, if not better, by a small body of responsible men equipped for the 
task and in possession of all the statistical facts necessary to determine a fair price justified by 
the circumstances of the day.’381 
 
                                               










A major criticism of the Marketing Act was the imbalance in the level of support it provided 
to full scale commercial farmers compared with basic subsistence farmers.382 This resulted in 
increased poverty in South Africa’s rural areas.  The Marketing Act of 1937 was amended in 
1968. The amendments allowed for the development of agricultural schemes to regulate 
particular agricultural products; management of the scheme was vested in a board of 
administrators.383 
 
The Marketing Act of 1968 also vested the following powers in the Minister of Agriculture, 
with respect to international agricultural trade: 
(i) the power to ban the import or export of a product altogether384; 
(ii) the power to confer the sole right to import or export a product385 on the Director-
General or a Control Board, and  
(iii) the power to prohibit the import or export of a product, except by a Control Board or 
a person authorised by the Board, under conditions determined by the Board.386 
 
Therefore the Marketing Act and various subsidiary pieces of legislation were promulgated to 
control the domestic agricultural industry. In 1978, the government introduced the Sugar 
Act.387This contained a price fixing mechanism, and went as far as to suggest a procedure to 
divide profits from price fixing between growers and millers.388 
 
The next major development occurred in 1992, when the Department of Agriculture 
appointed a committee to determine whether the Marketing Act of 1968 would be suitable to 
address the needs of a new democratic era.389 The committee’s investigation revealed inter 
alia the following: 
(i) The system of marketing agricultural products in South Africa was ineffective 
because farmers developed new channels to promote their products;390 and 
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(ii) The Marketing Act aimed to ‘create fair and equal access to as many producers as 
possible’ but apartheid legislation ensured that minority large-scale commercial 
farmers dominated the industry.391 
 
The committee inter alia made the following recommendations: 
(i) Schemes should operate as private and voluntary organisations outside of the 
Marketing Act;392 
(ii) An Agricultural Marketing Council should be created that should be 
representative of the demographics of South Africa;393 
(iii) The Agricultural Marketing Council should advise the Minister of Agriculture on 
international and domestic trade issues such as competition and tariff policies.394 
 
The committee’s report played a critical role in shaping the future of agriculture regulation in 
South Africa. Ntshephe observes that, ‘between the release of the Kassier (committee) report 
in January 1993 and the promulgation of (the) new legislation, ten of the existing Boards 
were abolished’.395 With the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, change in this 
particular sector was inevitable.  
 
ii)  Deregulation Phase (1996 ONWARDS) 
 
After the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa began the process of reforming its 
domestic legislation to fit the new constitutional dispensation. The Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act was promulgated in 1996.396 This took the recommendations of the committee 
into account as regards empowering previously disadvantaged South Africans’.397 The new 
Act paved the way for the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC), a variant of the 
recommended National Marketing Council.398 The NAMC has the power to conduct 
investigations and advise the Minister on agricultural market access.399 With regard to 













international trade, the NAMC is required to consider international trends and developments 
in advising the Minister on agricultural market access.400 
 
Backed by the Department of Agriculture, the Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture 
was formulated in 2001, with one of its goals being to increase the sector’s global 
competitiveness.401 In pursuit of this goal, the Agricultural Marketing Information System 
was launched in 2007. This further deregulated agricultural markets, encouraging South 
African farmers to export their products402 and thus fulfilling one of the cornerstones of the 
AoA- developing market access. 
 
However Ntshephe argues that a particular consequence of deregulation was that farmers had 
to adapt to international standards and were required to become business-minded 
entrepreneurs who could decide what to produce, and how and for whom to produce, in line 
with contemporary market requirements.403 Coupled with the lack of finance and modern 
technology, Ntshephe concludes that emerging farmers have had difficulty competing with 
imported products.404 
 
Ntshephe’s405 research on the history and development of agricultural policy in South Africa 
provides a holistic understanding of South Africa’s agricultural policy. Attention now turns to 
how the AoA has been implemented in South Africa. 
 
4.3.2 Implementation of the AoA in South Africa 
 
In contrast to Ntshephe406, Sandrey407 grouped South African agricultural policy under four 
pillars. This thesis submits that the ‘pillar’ approach is a useful framework for accurately 
analysing South Africa’s agricultural policies and regulation. 
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The first pillar involves unilateral policies that govern domestic agriculture. Sandrey briefly 
covers the deregulation of the South African agricultural sector and emphasises that 
deregulation took place via reduced tariffs and export subsidies, changes in marketing 
institutions and labour policy and land-reform initiatives.408 Sandrey concludes that, 
compared with the rest of the world, South Africa’s agricultural sector is not highly 
regulated.409 
 
The second pillar involves bilateral policies that govern South Africa and one other country.  
Sandrey cites the example of the Trade, Development and Corporation 
Agreement410(TDCA).411 The TDCA was entered into between South Africa and the EU on 1 
January 2000. The objective of the TDCA is to make trade between South Africa and the EU 
duty free.412 
 
The third pillar involves regional policies that govern a group of countries including South 
Africa. Sandrey cites the example of the South African Customs Union Agreement of 2002. 
This agreement facilitates trade between South Africa and regional African partners through a 
common trade policy.413 
 
The final pillar involves multilateral policies that govern all members of the WTO. Sandrey 
cites the example of GATT 1994 and the AoA.414 
 
It is submitted that Sandrey’s415 categorisation of South Africa’s agricultural policies into 
four pillars provides a sound explanation of the economic impact of agricultural policy in the 
country. These pillars are a useful framework to understand how international trade policy 
has affected South Africa.  
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After joining the WTO in 1995, South Africa began the process of reforming its domestic 
legislation in order to fall in line with WTO provisions, particularly the AoA.416 The 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (The Act) was enacted in order to implement 
the AoA and limit state intervention in agricultural trade.417 It aimed to improve market 
access and promote export trade.418 The remaining part of this section discusses South 
Africa’s commitments in light of market access, domestic support and export subsidies.  
 
With regard to market access, as a developing nation, South Africa undertook to convert all 
non-tariff barriers into tariff equivalents and thus completed its tariffication process as 
required by the WTO.419 Ad valorem tariffs420 apply to agricultural products while a tariff 
quota of 20 per cent applies to agricultural products which are under minimum market 
access.421 Specific products like milk, butter, sugar, cheese, bovine meat, and cigarettes, 
tobacco and sheep meat have tariffs of more than 15 per cent, in order to protect the value-
adding processing industry in South Africa.422 
 
In addition, South Africa has committed to maintain and improve market access opportunities 
at between 3 per cent and 5 per cent of its domestic consumption of agricultural products.423 
The country is therefore compliant with the AoA with regard to improving agricultural 
market access.424 
 
With regard to domestic support, as discussed in chapter three, each country had to commit to 
reducing its Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) to agriculture. A total AMS reduction of 
13 per cent was applied to South Africa to be implemented over a period of ten years, from 
1995 to 2004.425 Ani-Oluchi observes that that approximately 96 percent of the support 
currently in place in South Africa takes the form of Market Price Support (MPS), a tool used 
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to maintain domestic prices of farm products.426 These products include sugar, wheat, maize, 
milk, meat, and fruit.427 However, South Africa is still regarded as compliant with the AoA in 
respect of domestic support because it has reduced its total AMS since 1995.428 
 
With regard to export subsidies, South Africa's total export subsidy outlay commitment in 
1995 was R842 million.429 This was built up during the 1980s when the government provided 
export incentives.430 However in July 1997, the General Export Incentive Scheme was 
discontinued due to South Africa’s reduction commitments to the WTO.431 Since the 
abolition of the Scheme, South Africa has provided no agricultural export subsidies.432 The 
country is therefore fully compliant with the AoA with regard to export subsidies.  
 
Therefore South Africa is compliant in all three areas of AoA reform; this is reflected in the 
Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs’ statement that, ‘South Africa's priority is to ensure 
compliance with agricultural commitments in the WTO’.433 The Ministry further notes that 
South Africa made concessions during the Uruguay Round to various agricultural lobbies in 
developed countries, which have resulted in high levels of domestic support and export 
subsidies in these countries.434 South African agricultural producers are therefore 
disadvantaged because the government does not provide equivalent domestic support or 
export subsidies.435 South Africa has argued for a reduction in export subsidies and a 
framework that will assist developing countries.436 This thesis submits that whilst South 
Africa has affirmed its commitment to the AoA, the country must continue to strive for 
agricultural liberalisation, especially for developing countries. It further argues that South 





                                               
426Ibid 43.  
427Ibid 43.  
428Ibid 42.  
429Simbi (note 423 above). 
430Ani-Oluchi (note 416 above) 44.  
431Ibid 44.  








4.4 SECTION C: SOUTH AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND BRICS 
 
South Africa is inter alia a member of the Cairns Group, the African and Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries Group, G-90, G-20, G-33 and W52.437 In addition to these international 
groups, South Africa is a member of the BRICS group.438 This section analyses the effect of 
South Africa’s agricultural law and policy on its trading partners, particularly BRICS. It is 
divided into four parts: 4.4.1 Background to BRICS, 4.4.2 The role of South Africa in 
BRICS, 4.4.3 Agriculture within BRICS, and 4.4.4 Issues at the BRICS level. 
 
4.4.1 Background to BRICS 
 
The acronym ‘BRIC’ was first used Goldman Sachs in 2001, during their economic forecast 
exercise.439It was forecast that the four BRIC nations would play a major role in the global 
economy for the next 50 years. This startled the international community, as the four BRIC 
nations had contributed a meager 4 per cent of world trade during 1990.440 
 
At the time the Goldman Sachs report was released, the BRIC nations were already 
undergoing major internal changes. Brazil adopted a drastic economic stabilisation plan to 
counter hyperinflation and India introduced sweeping economic reforms in the early 1990s.441 
While China emerged unscathed from the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, Russia put 
a strategy in place to rebuild and regain its economic status.442 The Goldman Sachs exercise 
assumed that these nations would continue the impetus achieved through structural reforms. 
 
However the exercise did not assume that the four countries would formalise a relationship. 
In 2006, ministers from the BRIC nations met to discuss the possibility of forming a group.443 
The BRIC group was finalised in Russia when Ministers from each of the four nations 
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attended the first official summit on 16 June 2009.444 The group expanded to ‘BRICS’ when 
South Africa was invited to join in 2010.445 
 
4.4.2 The role of South Africa in BRICS 
 
South Africa’s invitation to join BRICS was extended by the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. This offered opportunities for increased trade and investment as well as a platform 
for an African voice on the international stage.446 Collectively the countries called for a 
review of international financial mechanisms and a combined effort towards global trade 
cooperation.447 
 
In March 2013, South Africa hosted the fifth BRICS Summit at the Durban International 
Convention Centre (ICC).448 This summit strengthened South Africa’s international 
recognition as a BRICS member, and reinforced its leverage as a possible gateway into 
Africa.449 Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr. Rob Davies highlighted South Africa’s role 
within BRICS with regard to the African continent: 
 
‘We continue to be a significant gateway into the African continent. We make a distinction 
between being a gateway and a gatekeeper. We do not try to say that all trade and investment 
relations from other BRICS countries must come through us. It would be a lost cause if we 
tried to do that. But we know that many companies from BRICS and from elsewhere find it 
convenient to work with South Africa and South African institutions in terms of their broader 
continental programmes. In one way or another, our fellow BRICS members realise that in 
choosing us.’450 
 
However, there are two sides to this coin. On the one hand, the BRIC nations have been 
criticized for including South Africa and on the other hand, there have been positive 
arguments supporting South Africa’s position in BRICS. Besada questions South Africa’s 
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‘worthiness’ to fit into the BRIC structure.451 As noted above, Goldman Sachs predicted that 
the BRIC nations would be the leading economies by 2050. This has been supported by the 
fact that China, India and Brazil have experienced phenomenal economic growth over the 
past decade. By 2010, Chinese GDP had grown by 10. 3 per cent, India’s by 9. 7 per cent and 
Brazil’s by 7.5 per cent. This is in stark contrast to the meager 2.8 per cent growth posted by 
South Africa during the same period. Adding to this anomaly is the fact that South Africa, 
with a population of 50 million is diminutive compared with China and India with 
populations of 1.3 billion and 1.2 billion, respectively.452 
 
Furthermore, South Africa has the highest unemployment rate amongst the BRICS nations. 
According to Hoeppli, ‘Although Brazil and Russia achieved rather modest GDP growth 
rates in the last quarter of 2012 (in a BRICS comparison), unemployment rates are just over 
5%. China, whose economy grew by about 10% every year since the beginning of the 
century, reports an official unemployment rate of 4.1%. This is in stark contrast with South 
Africa, whose unemployment rate is about 25%. Significant economic growth, well above 
current growth, will be required to absorb a large number of additional people into the active 
workforce’.453 
 
Despite South Africa’s poor performance in comparison with other BRICS members, the 
country has the highest market capitalization ratios in the world. It has been argued that South 
Africa entered BRICS not as a Goldman Sachs prediction, but as the most developed 
economy on the African continent.454  Besada describes the country as ‘characterised by an 
abundant supply of mineral resources; well-developed legal, energy, financial, and 
communications and transportation sectors; a modern infrastructure that supports an efficient 
distribution of goods and services to major urban centres throughout the country; and an 
active stock exchange that ranks among the top 20 in the world’.455 
 
Another positive factor in South Africa’s favour is its global ranking in terms of how easy it 
is to start a small business. Again, Hoeppli notes that ‘entrepreneurship and small businesses 
are important for growth and employment; yet, starting and successfully running a business is 
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a challenging endeavour – in some countries even more so than in others. In the 2013 World 
Bank report Doing Business 2013 – Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises, South Africa obtained the best ranking among the BRICS countries in terms of 
ease of doing business (rank 39), with a fair distance to China (ranked 91). The World Bank 
ranked the remaining three BRICS countries in the bottom half of all the countries considered 
(Russian Federation (112), Brazil (130) and India (132)).’456 
 
South African Trade and Industry Minister, Rob Davies, also indicated that the BRICS 
countries would benefit from direct trade in their own currencies, which would protect them 
from volatile international convertible currencies such as the US Dollar.457 In support of this 
objective development banks from each member of the group signed a framework agreement 
on cooperation among their national financial development institutions to establish mutual 
credit lines to be denominated in local currencies.458 These funds are likely to be channeled to 
investment in infrastructure, reflected by China’s intention to contribute 10 billion Yuan to 
the group for oil and gas projects.459 
 
Banking and finance also play a significant part in the BRICS group. South Africa’s largest 
bank, Standard Bank, has sold 20 per cent of its shares to the International Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC).460 This allows these banks to access investment opportunities in both Asia 
and Africa and also creates a platform for intercontinental agriculture projects.461  Further 
developments include the decision by the leaders of the member countries at the fifth BRICS 
summit to establish a BRICS Development Bank to help finance infrastructure programs and 
sustainable development in BRICS.462 
 
While there are arguments for and against South Africa’s worthiness to sit at the BRICS 
table, this thesis holds the view that South Africa is worthy of being a member of BRICS. 
Despite the fact that South Africa’s population might not be as big as her BRICS 
counterparts, this thesis submits that, as a fledgling democracy, South Africa has the potential 
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to be a gateway to Africa. As such, the country is a significant African partner for the BRICS 
group.  
 
4.4.3 Agriculture within BRICS  
 
Interestingly, the first round of BRICS meetings revolved around agriculture. Singh notes that 
the immediate focus was to ease the burden of soaring global food prices.463 Ministers from 
each of the BRIC nations met in 2010 and agreed to: i) create an agricultural information-
based system; ii) develop a general strategy to ensure access to food for the most vulnerable 
sections of the community; iii) reduce the negative impact of climate change on food security 
and adapt agriculture to climate change; and iv) enhance agricultural technology co-operation 
and innovation.464 This was followed by the formation of a BRICS Agricultural Co-operation 
Working Group that formulated a 2012 to 2016 action plan for Agricultural Cooperation of 
BRICS Countries.465 This plan involved five activities, each to be co-ordinated by a different 
BRICS member.466 The first is the creation of a basic agricultural information system for 
BRICS countries, to be co-ordinated by China; the second is the development of a general 
strategy to ensure access to food for the most vulnerable population, to be coordinated by 
Brazil; the third is addressing the negative impact of climate change on food security and 
adaptation of agriculture to climate change, to be co-ordinated by South Africa; the fourth is 
enhancing agricultural technology co-operation and innovation, to be co-ordinated by India; 
and the fifth is trade and investment promotion, to be co-ordinated by Russia.467 It is 
submitted that this represents a holistic approach to agricultural development as it includes 
trade, finance and technological aspects of food security.468 
 
Within the BRICS group, statistics show that Brazil is the biggest exporter of agricultural 
products to the world with estimated revenue of $81.5 billion for 2011 alone.469 Brazil is 
followed by China, India, Russia and finally South Africa with $7.2 billion.470  Brazil is also 
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the main exporter to Africa, with an estimated $8.4 billion in agricultural exports to the 
continent.471 
 
The main agricultural items exported by BRICS nations to Africa are sugar, cereals, and 
meat.472Although South Africa is considered a major sugar producer with exports of $189 
million in 2011, Brazil leads the African sugar market with a total export value of $4399 
million.473 Further Brazil dominates meat exports to the continent with a value of $1390 
million in 2011.474 This is in stark contrast to South Africa’s $41 million in meat exports for 
the same period.475 Russia is the leading exporter of cereals to the continent.476 In total, sugar, 
cereals and meat form 65.8 per cent of the agricultural products exported from BRICS to 
Africa.477 
 
Unlike the EU, Brazil’s agricultural growth has not been spurred by domestic support.478 This 
is reflected in the OECD calculation for Producer Support Estimate which has been an 
average 5.0.479 To put this figure into perspective, the EU’s average for Producer Support 
Estimate is 22.0.480  Since deregulation, South Africa, like Brazil, has a low Producer Support 
Estimate481 with a rating of 2.2 in 2011.482 
 
If Producer Support has not driven agricultural growth in Brazil, what has? This question is 
answered by Sandrey; ‘The Real Plan brought about the budgetary restraints needed to bring 
the notorious Brazilian inflation under control and provided (initially) a relatively 
undervalued exchange rate that contributed to exports, structural reforms such as a 
privatization programme and the deregulation of domestic markets, and policy changes that 
included deep tariff cuts and a large reduction in non-tariff barriers’.483 Despite its lack of 
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arable land, China has established a thriving agricultural industry. The country achieved 
growth through intensive agricultural research and effective communication with farmers.484 
Sandrey suggests that the South African agricultural industry could benefit from studying 
how China has built her agricultural sector.  
 
Sandrey and Fundira conducted research on non-tariff measures in place with respect to 
agriculture in each of the BRIC nations485: 
 
 A number of internal measures assist agricultural production in Brazil including 
guaranteed producer prices and credit for producers at preferential rates.486 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector receives various domestic support measures from 
the government in the form of price support and stabalisation, option contracts, and a 
guaranteed minimum price, even though the level of these support measures is low487; 
 
 Agricultural support policies in India promote domestic production at the expense of 
imported goods.488 Import restrictions are in place to ensure domestic supply of 
specific products, and are removed or applied as circumstances require489; 
 
 The Chinese domestic agricultural sector obtains domestic support in the form of 
direct subsidies, input subsidies and market price support490; 
 
 The Russian Government regularly adjusts its national import regulations including 
tariffs and licensing without notice491;  
 
 India’s import regime remains complex, especially its licensing and permit system, as 
well as its tariff structure which has multiple exemptions that vary according to 
product, user, or specific export promotion programs.492 Furthermore, products that 
were subject to quantitative restrictions are now considered sensitive products and are 
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therefore subject to above average tariff rates.493 Examples include bamboo, cocoa, 
copra, cotton, milk and milk products, edible oils, good grains, fruits and vegetables, 
poultry, tea and coffee, spices and sugar.494 In addition, there is a wide gap between 
bound and applied tariffs, which allows the government to modify its tariffs 
substantially while still complying with WTO requirements495; 
 
 Chinese state trading enterprises restrict the imports of certain agricultural products, 
and have exclusive rights to import certain products.496 Furthermore, price distortions 
arise as these entities have the monopoly on agricultural products.497 
 
Sandrey and Fundira’s research demonstrates that barriers to agricultural trade still exist, 
especially amongst the BRICS nations. In light of these findings and bearing in mind the 
earlier discussion in section B, this thesis submits that South Africa is exceptionally 
compliant with the AoA when compared with its BRICS counterparts. Furthermore, it argues 
that South Africa should use its compliance with the AoA as a tool to further its agricultural 
objectives at the next Ministerial Conference.  
 
4.4.4 Issues at BRICS level 
 
However, there are issues that need to be resolved at BRICS level. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2012 highlighted several issues with respect to BRICS.498 These include inadequate 
infrastructure; a lack of institutionalisation; the heterogeneous nature of the BRICS group and 
a lack of cohesive identity; the fragile nature of trade and investment linkages among the 
BRICS countries; and differences within the group on values, economics, political structures 
and geopolitical interests.499As Singh points out, if these issues are not addressed, they ‘could 
pose serious challenges to the realisation of what was predicted by Goldman Sachs’.500 
 












Recently agricultural products from the EU destined for Russia have been stopped501 due to 
the retaliatory embargo imposed by Russia on EU and US products as part of the ‘tit-for-tat’ 
sanctions on the Ukraine crises.502 It has been estimated that 700 000 tons of apples from 
Poland have been refused access due to the embargo.503 Furthermore, 250 truckloads of 
peaches and nectarines already en route to Russia had to be stopped when the embargo 
began.504 
 
Agricultural products that cannot be sold are returned to their host country and destroyed505 
as an oversupply would drastically affect the market price, forcing producers to reduce their 
prices.506 This embargo has led to a surplus of agricultural products in the EU.507 The EU is 
one of South Africa’s strongest export markets and South Africa and Russia are both 
members of BRICS. Whether Russia will influence South Africa to reduce its trade with the 
EU through BRICS remains to be seen.508 
 
Whilst BRICS seems to offer South Africa lucrative prospects, this thesis submits that the 
country should be wary of losing its foothold on the African continent. As noted earlier, 
Brazil, Russia, India and China have bigger populations and better GDPs. The BRICS 
alliance could result in increased agricultural exports from these countries that could threaten 
South African agricultural exports in the long run. Besada agrees with this view:  
‘If the planned free-trade agreements with India, Brazil and China come to fruition, South 
Africa could be faced with increased BRIC-manufactured exports. Chinese exports have 
already ‘decimated’ the textile sector in South Africa and the shoe industry in Brazil, while 
India has resorted to applying antidumping duties on various Chinese goods.’509 
Therefore South Africa should identify how its membership of BRICS will influence its role 
in Africa.’510 
 
Sandrey’s analysis of the impact of agricultural exports from BRICS into Africa511 
demonstrated that South Africa has lost market share to the original BRIC members in 
                                               













virtually all African markets except Zimbabwe in recent years, and in all products except fats 
and oils.512 This is unsurprising considering that Brazil ranks third in the developing world in 
terms of public agricultural research and development investments, after China and India.513 
South Africa can therefore benefit from its BRICS alliance by investigating agricultural 
technologies researched by its BRICS counterparts.514 
 
Furthermore, Brazil faces a shortage of agricultural land. Of a total of land area of 851 
million hectares,515 496 million hectares is protected due to the Amazon rainforest.516 
However, with deregulation and increased global demand for Brazilian soybean, producers 
are caught between production and conservation.517 Sandrey reports that pasture land 
currently used by livestock farmers is being converted to crop farms.518 This forces livestock 
into protected areas such as the Amazon to feed519 and endangers the Amazonian ecosystem 
including local plant and animal life.520 Therefore the social and environmental impact of 
Brazilian agriculture will be an important aspect for leaders to consider at the next BRICS 
summit.521 This thesis submits that the environment should be regarded as an important 
stakeholder when considering agriculture policies. Adverse agriculture policies that destroy a 
local ecosystem should be renegotiated in order to find methods that can still produce 
agricultural products but without damaging the environment. 
 
Brazil aside, the issue of agricultural land is a collective BRICS issue. Amongst the BRICS 
nations, India has the most arable land (157923 hectares), followed by Russia (121750 
hectares), China (109999 hectares), Brazil (61200 hectares) and South Africa (14350 
hectares).522 This demonstrates that South Africa has to plan its use of arable land carefully in 
order to achieve maximum gains with minimal environmental impact.523 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
















Another recent issue has been poultry imports from Brazil. The South African poultry 
industry is estimated to be worth R27 billion.524 There is huge demand for poultry as it is a 
cheap source of protein and is part of a nutritious diet for many South Africans.525 However 
the landing cost of imported Brazilian poultry was considerably cheaper than South African 
producers’ production costs. Rising input costs in South Africa such as electricity and feed 
costs could not be passed on to the consumer. For example the cost of electricity rose by 100 
per cent between 2008 and 2011.526 At the same time, local poultry producers had to suppress 
their prices in order to compete with the low price of imported poultry. This resulted in many 
large poultry companies reporting annual losses and forecasting the downsizing of their 
operations.527 
 
In March 2013, the South African Poultry Association (SAPA) submitted an application to 
the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), requesting an increase in import 
tariffs on selected frozen poultry products.528 The application was based on three grounds: (1) 
the domestic poultry production industry was being destroyed by foreign products; (2) the 
high risk of job losses linked to reduced domestic demand; and (3) a lack of food security 
within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region.529 
 
In response to the SAPA application, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies 
announced on 30 September 2013that South Africa would increase import duties on five 
categories of frozen poultry. The decision came into effect the same day through Notice 715 
in Government Gazette No 36876.530 The increased poultry tariffs apply to all countries that 
export to South Africa, except those that have signed trade agreements with the Republic, 
such as the EU.531 
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Fourie argues that increased tariffs will not assist the domestic poultry industry because they 
are a short term fix for a long term problem.532 He notes that inefficiencies in domestic 
poultry production such as high input costs lead to expensive domestic products and a 
demand for cheaper foreign poultry products.533 Fourie supports his argument by noting that 
from 2001 to 2010, the average annual increase in the production and consumption of 
chicken was 6.2 per cent and 7.1 per cent, respectively. The gap between production and 
consumption was filled by imported chickens.534 Furthermore Fourie observes that:  
 
‘It is anticipated that the immediate impact of the increase in import duties will lead to an 
even greater shift in imports. While the tariffs will impose heavy penalties on Latin American 
producers, for example, imports from European countries will be unaffected by the tariff 
increase, meaning that European chicken imports will in all likelihood substitute chicken 
imports from elsewhere’.535 
 
In other words, there will always be constant demand for imported poultry in South Africa, 
and if this demand is not met by Brazil, it will be met from elsewhere, such as the EU.536 
 
The Chief Executive of the South African Poultry Association, Mr. Kevin Lovell disagreed 
with Fourie and stated that if the domestic poultry industry is not protected, South Africa’s 
national food security will be at risk because it will not be able to feed its own population.537 
He cautioned that poultry imports would ‘only last as long as the exporting countries are 
happy with the prices paid; the minute they are able to get a better price elsewhere, they will 
sell their poultry to that country.’538 
 
Consultations are taking place between South Africa and Brazil at the WTO on increased 
poultry tariffs.539 Brazil argues that the imposition of anti-dumping duties is inconsistent with 
South Africa’s obligations under GATT 1994.540 In the interests of fostering better trade 






537Lovell ‘Poultry imports slaughter industry’ available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-31-00-poultry-
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relations, this thesis submits that South Africa and Brazil should come up with a mutually 
beneficial solution that will enable them to present a unified front at the next Ministerial 
Conference. The benefit of this win-win approach is that it will foster ties between two 
developing countries that are part of the BRICS group. 
 
Based on the evidence, this thesis submits that it is paramount that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry together with the South African Poultry Association iron out inefficiencies in the 
domestic industry, particularly high input costs and poor disease control. Furthermore, it 
argues that failure to remedy these inefficiencies will result in South Africa being vulnerable 




This chapter examined the AoA in the context of the South African agricultural industry, and 
explored the potential impact of the country’s membership of BRICS on this sector. Based on 
the evidence, this thesis argues that South Africa is compliant with the provisions of the AoA. 
Nonetheless, the country is experiencing rapidly increasing rates of household food 
insecurity.541 Fourteen million South Africans suffer hunger and inadequate nutrition on a 
daily basis.542 This thesis therefore concludes that the AoA has not benefited South African 
consumers. 
 
The BRICS group must work together to achieve food security within the group. Based on 
the Goldman Sachs prediction, this thesis argues that BRICS has the potential and the 
resources to feed their populations. Trade statistics for 2011 support the Goldman Sachs 
prediction, with the BRICS nations’ share of global trade growing to 15 per cent.543  As Singh 
notes, this represents a 150 per cent increase in trade activity over the past 20 years.544 It is 
therefore submitted that South Africa is fortunate to be part of BRICS and should use this 
group as a platform to promote and achieve food security for its people. 
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This chapter concludes with a quote from Sandrey highlighting how Brazil used its 
agricultural industry as a tool to improve socio-economic rights; this could inspire South 
Africa to do likewise: 
 
‘Brazil’s ability to raise more than 40 million people into middle-class income categories and 
the lowering of abject poverty levels from 23% to 8% in less than two decades should serve 



























                                               




CHAPTER 5  
 




The Ninth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) took place in 
Bali, Indonesia, from 3 to 7 December 2013. The Conference resulted in a series of 
decisions546 that impacted global trade facilitation, food security and the least-developed 
countries.547 Das argues that the Bali Ministerial Conference established the WTO as the pre-
eminent forum for negotiating global trade rules548, since many countries had recently opted 
to negotiate trade rules outside of the WTO, through various free trade agreements (FTAs).549 
The Conference was a major step towards the possible completion of the Doha Round of 
WTO negotiations that began in early 2001. 
 
Having said this, it is important to place this conference in the context of current multilateral 
trade negotiations. Prior to the 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, members agreed to 
select issues that have the potential to be agreed more quickly than complex issues that 
require detailed negotiations.550 The rationale for this approach was to speed up the Doha 
Round in order to achieve some success under the WTO.551 With this in mind, members 
submitted proposals on three areas that impact agriculture: phasing out agricultural export 
subsidies (export subsidies), regulations on import quotas (market access) and promoting 
food security (domestic support).552 The most controversial decision at the Bali Ministerial 
Conference relates to food security. As a result of the controversy, more research has been 
conducted on the impact of the food security decision than on the other two aspects.  
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This chapter critically analyses this Ministerial Conference with a view to determining the 
extent to which particular decisions taken at the Conference will affect the AoA. It is divided 
into four sections: 
i) Section A provides the background to the Bali Ministerial Conference; 
ii) Section B presents a detailed discussion of the main elements of the Bali Package; 
iii) Section C discusses developments relating to market access and export subsidies; 
and 
iv) Section D analyses the Bali Package’s relevance to South Africa. 
 
5.2 SECTION A: BACKGROUND TO THE BALI MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
 
In the days leading up to the Bali Ministerial Conference, the credibility of the multilateral 
trading system was at stake.553 Some554 believed that Bali would produce another stalemate, 
which would lead to the permanent collapse of the Doha Development Round. Besides the 
risk of another stalemate, others saw the WTO competing with outside trade interests such as 
bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements.555 However, the four days of negotiations 
resulted in a breakthrough not only for member countries but for the WTO itself. The Bali 
Ministerial Conference produced the first global agreement on trade facilitation in almost 20 
years.556 This led to the EU Trade Commissioner, Mr Karel De Gucht announcing that, ‘We 
have saved the WTO’.557 This offered new hope for the future of both the WTO and 
multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
As noted above, pre-negotiations for the Bali Ministerial Conference began in November 
2013, when the first set of draft texts was circulated between members.558 The goal was to 
produce final versions in respect of selected issues for ministers to consider in Bali.559 After 
the draft texts were circulated, intensive consultations followed, and some difficult 
compromises were struck in order to produce the texts that were forwarded to the ministers in 
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554‘South Africa and the Post-Bali Global Architecture’ Available at http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-
analysis/south -africa-and-the-post-bali-global-trading-architecture accessed on 15 October 2014. 
555An example is the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement spearheaded by the USA that specifically excludes 
China. More on this can be found at ibid. 
556WTO post Bali (note 553 above). 
557Ibid. 





Bali.560 The WTO notes that, even then, some members had reservations either with respect 
to some parts of the texts themselves, or on how they would fit into the overall package of 
issues for Bali.561 
 
WTO members commenced negotiations with the 2008 modalities that were compiled by 
New Zealand Ambassador, Crawford Falconer who chaired the talks at that time.562  The 
2008 modalities were the result of eight years of tough negotiations563, and represent progress 
during the Doha Round.564 
 
5.3 SECTION B: MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE BALI PACKAGE  
 
After four days of negotiations, WTO members successfully concluded a deal that would 
come to be known as the ‘Bali Package’.565 This marked the first occasion that a multilateral 
trade deal was agreed to by WTO members since the organisation was formed two decades 
before.566 In essence, the final agreement consists of a three-page declaration reflecting 
decisions on three pillars: (i) agreement on trade facilitation, (ii) public stockholding for food 
security purposes567, and (iii) selected development-focused provisions.568 Each of these 
pillars is examined below. 
 
5.3.1 Agreement on Trade Facilitation 
 
Trade facilitation has been defined as the ‘simplification and harmonisation of border trade 
procedures with respect to activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, 
presenting, communicating and processing data and other requirements for cross-border 
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566R Bendini ‘WTO back on track after Bali’ (2013) European Parliament: Directorate-General for External 
Policies- Policy Department1, 1. 
567Includes a decision on the cotton industry: ‘Ministers also consented to improve market access for cotton 
products from least-developed countries, and to offer greater assistance for production in those countries.’ Ibid. 




movement of goods’.569 In other words trade facilitation is about making the transfer of goods 
between different countries as simple as possible, without complicated administrative work. 
Whilst this is not a new concept, the increased emphasis accorded it prior to the Bali 
Ministerial Conference led members to adopt the Agreement on Trade Facilitation.570 This 
Agreement is expected to reduce the cost of international trade by simplifying customs 
procedures and regulations. The Agreement itself is split into two sections: procedurals 
aspects related to trade facilitation (such as border cooperation) and technical aspects (such as 
upgrading of infrastructure).571 
 
Furthermore, the Agreement on Trade Facilitation is expected to benefit the global economy. 
Some analysts have estimated that the gain in trade emanating from the Agreement to be in 
the region of a trillion dollars. It is clear that after years of collapsed conferences, the Bali 
Ministerial Conference restored faith in the multilateral trading system.572 Furthermore, it has 
been recognised as an important step towards the completion of the Doha Round.573 
 
Despite its perceived benefits, it has been argued that the Agreement on Trade Facilitation 
favours developed over developing countries because developing countries could experience 
an increased flow of imports that will have a spill-over effect into their domestic industries.574 
Furthermore, this thesis submits that developed countries do not confront the same 
infrastructure and technology challenges faced by developing countries.575 It therefore 
criticises the Agreement on Trade Facilitation for not taking the developmental needs of 
developing countries into account, especially in light of import and export capacity to 
compete with developed countries.  
 
Although the Agreement on Trade Facilitation does not deal directly with agriculture, it is 
relevant as it covers trade in all goods.576 Furthermore, the agreement states that perishable 
goods must be released in the shortest possible time, even if government officials have to 
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work outside business hours.577 This thesis submits that, by implication, this will have an 
effect on agricultural trade as most agricultural products are perishable.  
 
5.3.2 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes 
 
Historically, domestic support has been a thorny issue at the WTO. As noted above, this was 
the most controversial issue at the Bali Ministerial Conference. Members debated whether or 
not to increase the limit of amber box support. One of the issues at hand was whether 
governments should be allowed to procure food from low income farmers at a fixed price in 
order to subsidise these farmers’ livelihoods.578 A government’s ability to provide domestic 
support depends on available resources.579 Whilst domestic support encouraged agricultural 
production, the consequence was often a surplus of products that needed to find its way onto 
the world market.  
 
This viewpoint is substantiated by Desta who explains that, compared with other sectors in 
agriculture a country’s national domestic support policies effectively dictate its foreign trade 
policy.580 For example, countries with resources and technical and institutional capacity have 
successful agricultural domestic support policies that lead to surplus production, which 
requires export subsidies in order to dispose of this surplus production on the world 
market.581 This thesis agrees with Desta’s views and cites the example of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) adopted by the EU582. The CAP provides for significant domestic 
support that has resulted in a surplus of agricultural products, which are then dumped on 
global markets.583 
 
Of interest, is that other authors believe that the domestic support decision taken at the Bali 
Ministerial Conference represents a shift in focus from developed countries to developing 
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countries.584 Since the advent of the AoA, domestic support had been a restraint on developed 
countries as it limited how much could be given to their farmers in terms of the three boxes of 
domestic support.585  However with the rise of developing economies such as India, countries 
that previously could not afford domestic support are now able to do so.586 Therefore Josling 
argues that domestic support decisions are now more likely to constrain developing countries 
from spending on their farmers than developed countries,587 representing a major shift from 
developed to developing countries. 
 
Furthermore, the nature of negotiating leverage has changed with regard to domestic support. 
At previous Ministerial Conferences, developed country members used domestic support as a 
trade off in order to gain market access in developing countries.588  In other words, developed 
countries would barter a decrease in domestic support in exchange for better market share in 
developing countries. However with more resources now available to developing countries 
and thus opportunities to compete in providing domestic support, the negotiating leverage has 
changed. Exchanging greater market access for cuts in domestic support may no longer be 
feasible when developing countries can match or exceed developed countries’ domestic 
support levels.589 Therefore as Josling points out, early agreement in this area is in the 
interests of the developed countries (particularly the USA and the EU).590 
 
The G33 proposal, led by India, was the main negotiating issue regarding domestic support at 
the Bali Ministerial Conference.591 Häberli describes this proposal as ‘the most politically 
controversial issue up to the very end of the Bali Conference.’592 In essence, the G33 
proposed to put more money in the hands of poor farmers by buying their crops at a stable 
and higher price, and to use these government purchases to feed the hungry, many of them 
the same farm families, with free or subsidised food distribution.593 However the problem 
was that under the AoA, the difference between the administered price and the market price is 
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considered a subsidy, and there is a limit to how much is permitted.594 In other words, this 
would be considered amber box domestic support on which the WTO has imposed a spending 
limit.  
 
Morrison notes that the main argument behind the original G33 proposal was that the current 
WTO Agreement does not allow developing countries sufficient policy space to address food 
security, whereas developed country members can continue to use trade distorting policies 
with very few limitations.595 
 
On the other hand, the USA took the view that any loosening of price and product support 
discipline would run counter to the agricultural reform process initiated in the AoA.596 It 
added that current green box subsidies allowed for stockpiles and domestic food aid which 
could accommodate food security programmes without market distorting effects.597 Pakistan 
argued that the Indian programmes were a taxpayer-financed measure that fitted into the 
amber box.598 However, it seems that Pakistan’s views were based on concerns that India’s 
stockpiling may lead to rice exports that competed with Pakistan basmati rice.599 
 
The USA also argued at the Bali Ministerial Conference, that India's expanded programme 
exceeded its limit and constituted a trade-distorting subsidy since the government could dump 
its surpluses on international markets.600 However not everyone agreed with this view. Mr 
Oliver De Schutter, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food pointed out 
that the Indian Food Security Bill was aimed at purchasing stocks from low income farmers 
for domestic distribution, rather than for export to foreign markets.601 Even though this thesis 
has not considered the Indian Food Security Bill, it agrees with the views held by Mr De 
Schutter that the logic of the G33 proposal is not to subsidise agricultural exports, but to 
increase domestic food security. As a result, it submits that fears that the Indian programme 
and the G33 proposal might lead to international dumping were unfounded.  
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Wise correctly criticised the stance taken by the USA at the Bali Ministerial Conference by 
arguing that the: ‘The hypocrisy602 of long time USA agricultural dumpers accusing 
developing countries of dumping is bad enough. But this particular USA complaint is even 
more cynical’.603 Wise adds that ‘India's support prices are only slightly higher than current 
market prices, but they appear much higher because of the AoA stipulation that administered 
prices be compared not to current prices but to the average international prices in 1986-88. 
Those are roughly one-sixth of current market prices, so any price the government pays today 
would seem to be a huge subsidy’.604 This view was supported by the Indian Union Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, Mr Shri Anand Sharma who insisted that the G33 proposal on 
food security aims to address the problems faced by developing countries due to out-dated 
WTO rules which base the agriculture subsidy calculation on external reference prices of 
1986-88, despite significant increases in global food prices during this period.605 The Minister 
concluded that ‘it is surely reasonable that we (developing countries) should not be asked to 
peg farm support calculations on prices which were prevailing thirty years ago!’606 
 
After considering the G33 proposal, WTO Ministers reached an interim decision on 7 
December 2013 that food stockholding would be permitted even if it infringed amber box 
commitments, as long as several conditions were met. The wording of the decision is as 
follows:  
‘support provided for traditional staple food crops in pursuance of public stockholding 
programmes for food security purposes existing as of the date of this Decision will be exempt 
from dispute settlement challenges before the WTO’607 
 
In addition, beneficiaries of the peace clause who exceed their amber box commitments have 
to first fulfil certain conditions: i) detailed notification obligations, ii) reporting and 
monitoring by the Committee on Agriculture, iii) acceptance of consultations on request by 
another member, and their programmes must be consistent with the criteria of paragraph 3, 
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footnote 5, and footnote 5 and 6 of Annex 2 to the AoA.608  Paragraph 4 specifies that the 
beneficiaries of the Decision ‘shall ensure that stocks procured under such programmes do 
not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other Members’.609 
 
As noted above, certain conditions are attached to this interim decision. A further condition is 
that the peace clause will only cover existing public stockholding programmes. Morrison 
indicates that this may be a challenge considering that the definition of the word ‘existing’ is 
not been clear.610 However Morrison supports these supplementary conditions as they limit 
the potential negative effect of the stocks acquired on the food security of other members and 
on global markets.611 Nonetheless, he cautions that it is not clear how compliance will be 
monitored and enforced.612 
 
This thesis submits that these conditions have weakened the purpose of the food stockholding 
decision. On the eve of the Bali Ministerial Conference, Mr Oliver De Schutter613 indicated 
that ‘trade rules must be shaped around the food security policies that developing countries 
need, rather than policies having to tiptoe around WTO rules’.614 This thesis is of the view 
that, on the one hand, it seems as if the WTO is allowing developing countries to build food 
security policies by adopting a temporary waiver; however, at the same time the WTO is 
discounting a large number of developing countries from building food security policies by 
imposing such strict conditions. This thesis echoes the views held by Mr De Schutter that 
‘food reserves are a crucial tool, not just in humanitarian crises but in the everyday struggle 
to provide a stable income to farmers and to ensure a steady flow of affordable foodstuffs to 
poor consumers, many of whom lack a basic social safety net’.615 It is therefore concluded 
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that by imposing strict conditions on the food security decision at Bali, the WTO failed to 
deliver on the G33 proposal.  
 
It is important to note that the Bali decision is an interim decision that will remain in force 
until a permanent decision is made at the next Ministerial Conference in 2017.616 Some 
developed countries have raised the objection that an interim decision will hamper progress 
as it will reduce incentives for countries such as India to negotiate a permanent solution.617 
However, Ranjan argues that the interim decision will be useful as it provides ample time for 
a country such as India to conduct an empirical analysis of whether any trade distortions 
result from the food stockholding program.618 However, Ranjan cautions that India should 
plan its program carefully to ensure that it can make a better case for protecting its program 
before the Committee on Agriculture at the WTO.619 This thesis submits that the interim 
decision has set the ball rolling for developing countries to have a greater impact at the next 
Ministerial Conference. If Bali produced a peace clause in favour of developing countries, the 
next Ministerial Conference could have even greater potential to expand their interests.  
 
However the Bali Ministerial decision on food stockholding can be criticised for its silence 
on how a dispute on amber box support would be handled should a member country 
demonstrate that a food stockholding policy has caused trade distortions.620 The normal 
protocol for a dispute before the WTO consists of an initial formal consultation between 
member countries, and, should that fail, the establishment of a dispute panel.621 The question 
is whether such a dispute panel has to power to reject a complainant’s right to bring such a 
case, and decline to rule on the basis of the Bali Decision even though a member may have 
established trade distortions.622 These vital issues would need to be addressed by a Dispute 
Settlement Body.623 
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It is encouraging that, at the end of the Bali Conference, both India and Pakistan, along with 
the rest of the WTO Membership, have accepted and even praised the Bali Decision on food 
security.624 The South African trade envoy stated that some progress was made for developing 
countries at the Conference, but that there is substantial technical work that needs to be done 
in order to follow up on the decision taken at Bali.625 Indian Trade Minister Sharma claimed 
that India had achieved its goal of ensuring that its stockholding programs are shielded from 
challenge until a permanent solution is reached to modify WTO rules in a way that reduces 
the chances that India's programs would breach its limits on trade-distorting subsidies.626 
 
5.3.3 Selected Development-Focused Provisions 
 
Least-developed countries (LDCs) are considered to be the poorest members of the global 
trading community.627 LDCs are estimated to be home to around 12 per cent of the world's 
population, yet account for only 1 per cent of the global trade in goods.628 The WTO has 
recognised that LDCs require special assistance to achieve their development objectives.629 
Therefore most WTO agreements, including the AoA630, provide for minimal obligations on 
LDCs and allow them flexibility in implementing WTO rules.631 This promotes LDCs’ 
participation in the multilateral trading system.632 
 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, WTO members agreed that members who 
could provide duty free and quota free market access to products that originate in LDCs 
should do so. The effect of this decision was to make exports from LDCs cheaper, thereby 
compensating for their inability to compete with other countries.633 
 
Prior to the Bali Ministerial Conference, members entertained the idea of imposing 97 per 
cent duty free and quota free market access to products that emanated from LDCs on all 
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WTO members.634 However members could not reach agreement. Unfortunately the Bali 
Ministerial Conference continued this trend, as the decision in Bali merely encourages 
developed and developing countries to grant increased duty free and quota free market access 
to products from LDCs.635 In other words, there is no legally binding commitment to grant 
duty free and quota free market access to LDCs.  
 
However a positive decision at the Bali Ministerial Conference is that members agreed that 
the WTO Committee on Trade and Development should conduct annual reviews of members’ 
efforts to provide LDCs with duty free and quota free market access.636 Jatkar describes this 
as a political commitment on the part of WTO members to promote LDCs’ integration into 
the multilateral trading system.637 This thesis criticises the Bali decision, on the grounds that 
negotiations on market access negotiations for LDCs commenced in 2005, and almost 10 
years on, members have not committed to duty free and quota free market access.  
 
In addition to market access, the Bali Ministerial Conference sought to make Rules of Origin 
easier for LDCs.638 Rules of Origin can be defined as an ‘economic nationality on products 
traded across borders, and define how much processing must take place locally before goods 
are considered to be the product of the exporting country.’639 In other words Rules of Origin 
describe the origin of products from different countries. In the past, LDCs have argued that 
Rules of Origin have inhibited their exporters due to the high costs of compliance.640 At the 
Bali Ministerial Conference, members agreed on a set of draft guidelines that make Rules of 
Origin simpler for exporters from LDCs. However, it remains to be seen whether or not 
members will adopt these draft guidelines as they are considered non-binding by the WTO.  
 
5.4 SECTION C: DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO MARKET ACCESS AND 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
As noted in chapter three, the main elements of the AoA are: market access, domestic support 
and export subsidies. Having examined how the Bali Ministerial Conference has affected 
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domestic support, the analyses now turns to how it affected the remaining two elements in 
respect of the AoA, namely, market access and export subsidies. 
 
5.4.1 Market Access 
 
As discussed in chapter three, prior to the Uruguay Round, many countries adopted forms of 
non-tariff barriers that inhibited market access. As a result, tariffication was introduced to 
convert all non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents.641 This ensured greater market access as 
exporters could reach foreign markets even though they were paying more in tariffs.642 The 
Uruguay Round also introduced tariff-rate quotas.643 These set an in-quota and an out-quota 
rate. If the total imported goods fall below a specific in-quota number, a lower tariff is paid, 
whereas if the total imported goods are higher than a specific out-quota number, a higher 
tariff is paid.644 The WTO has historically given members the opportunity to administer 
tariff-rate quotas in a variety of ways645 and methods chosen by members.646 
 
However, in many instances, tariff-rate quotas are unfilled because member countries are 
unfamiliar with the rules of an importing country.647 As a result the G20 submitted a proposal 
at the Bali Ministerial Conference to oblige members to provide more detailed rules on tariff-
rate quotas.648 The G20 proposal essentially comprised of two parts: i) provisions on 
procedural issues relating to tariff-rate quotas and ii) should a tariff-rate quota remain 
consistently under filled, a WTO member could ask the country to change the administration 
process for that specific tariff-rate quota for a trial period to see if the quota is filled.649 
Interestingly, the second part of the G20 proposal applied to developed countries only.650 In 
other words, according to the G20 proposal, the under fill mechanism would exempt all 
developing countries from the recommended process. 
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In Bali, Ministers decided that each member country should consider their allocation of tariff-
rate quotas and if quotas were under filled, they should ask the quota holders whether they 
would make them available to other potential users.651 Ministers also discussed the impact of 
the cotton industry on developing countries and took a decision to improve development 
assistance to cotton producers.652 
 
Prior to the Bali Ministerial Conference, a proposal was submitted by the G20653 countries on 
agricultural market access. This aimed to improve the administration of tariff-rate quotas.654 
Tariff-rate quotas refer to a situation where import duties are lower on quantities within the 
quotas and higher for quantities outside.655 Tariff quotas were agreed during the 1986–94 
Uruguay Round of negotiations to allow exporters access to foreign markets when the normal 
(out-of-quota) tariffs on imports were high.656 
 
At Bali Ministers agreed that where it is manifest that a tariff quota is under-filled but there 
appears to be no reasonable commercial reason for this, an importing member should ask 
private operators holding unused entitlements whether they would be prepared to make them 
available to other potential users.657 Where the tariff quota is held by a private operator in a 
third country, e.g. as a result of country-specific allocation arrangements, the importing 
member should transmit the request to the holder of the allocation concerned.658 
 
Desta659 argues that the Bali Ministerial Conference had both a progressive and regressive 
impact on agricultural market access:  
‘The ambitious proposal to apply a tiered and harmonising formula to reduce tariffs, to 
convert all specific and compound tariffs into their ad valorem equivalents, to reduce the in-
quota tariffs within TRQs and to enhance their use through more effective methods of 
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administration, and the effort to simplify tariffs can be cited as examples of a progressive 
agenda. On the other hand, the proposal to introduce new categories of products for special 
treatment (special products and sensitive products) and a new special safeguard mechanism 
(SSM) represent a degree of backsliding in the liberalisation process’.660 
 
This thesis submits that the Bali Ministerial Conference affected domestic support to a 
greater extent than market access. It further argues that in order to afford improved market 
access to developing countries, further negotiations on this issue will be required at the next 
Ministerial Conference in 2017.  
 
More recently, WTO members met with the Agriculture Committee on 5 June 2014 to 
discuss a way forward post-Bali. At this meeting, the USA proposed that the Secretariat 
compile data on members’ agricultural tariffs (maximum tariff levels legally bound in the 
WTO and the actual tariffs charged, which can be lower), and their global share of 
agricultural imports and exports.661 However other members argued that this data on trade 
and tariff profiles are already publicly available.662 Eventually, members agreed that the 
Secretariat should proceed since the task would only involve repackaging the information to 
make it easier to use.663 
 
In conclusion, market access is an important element of the AoA. World averages for 
agricultural tariffs are three times higher than the world average for non-agricultural tariffs.664 
This does not bode well for improving market access, especially for developing countries to 
gain market access to developed countries.665 Measures should be adopted at the next 
Ministerial Conference to reduce agricultural tariffs, or global trade in foods and farm goods 
will fall short of its potential to meet the ultimate challenges of feeding the world, responding 
to price instability and adapting to weather-related events.666 
 
Having discussed market access, the final element of the AoA is export subsidies.  
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5.4.2 Export Subsidies 
 
In contrast to domestic support and market access, the solution proposed for export subsidies 
has been described as progressive by authors such as Desta as it entails the phasing out of all 
agricultural export subsidies.667 Export subsidies have been controversial in agriculture 
negotiations since the early days of GATT.668 Despite clear evidence that export subsidies 
distort global trade, both the GATT and later the WTO permitted members to use these 
subsidies in pursuit of increasing foreign market share.669 This is demonstrated by the fact 
that export subsidies were banned in 1955 for all products under the WTO except 
agriculture.670 Desta describes this as tarnishing the image of the GATT/WTO system as it 
rewards the strong and punishes the weak as well as favouring the agricultural sector over 
other sectors.671 
 
With the recent increase in global market prices for agricultural products, agri-businesses 
have realised the potential for greater profit in foreign markets. This has decreased the need 
for governments to provide export subsidies as exports have been on a natural upward 
trend.672 As a result, during the July 2004 package, members made a commitment to achieve 
the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures 
with equivalent effect by a credible end date.673 Later in 2005, members at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial determined the ‘credible end date’ to be 31 December 2013.674 Unfortunately 31 
December 2013 has come and gone, and agricultural export subsidies still exist under the 
WTO regime.  However Desta argues that change will come as the commercial need for 
export subsidies is diminishing and the WTO has come to realise that it can ill-afford to keep 
such a damaging anomaly in its rulebook.675 
 
At the Bali Ministerial Conference, developing countries argued that demands that they 
commit to trade facilitation676 were not matched by developed countries’ willingness to make 
                                               













commitments on export subsidies.677 It is of concern that the Bali Ministerial Conference 
failed to deliver on export subsidies as no legally binding commitment was made to eliminate 
them. Instead members agreed to exercise the utmost restraint in using any form of export 
subsidy.678 This thesis submits that these ‘commitments’ represent nothing more than 
political statements by members and will make no significant difference as this has been an 
on-going issue since the commencement of the Doha Round.  
 
As indicated above, export subsidies remain a thorny issue amongst members. The WTO 
notes that little agreement has been reached on this issue despite the fact that it was the 
subject of much discussion among the delegates present in Geneva, Switzerland, especially 
given the difference between Argentina’s position, which favours the elimination or reduction 
of subsidies, and that of the USA and the EU.679 This thesis submits that change will only 
occur when members make a firm decision to completely prohibit all forms of export 
subsidies. As such, the next Ministerial Conference in 2017 will be important.  
 
More recently, WTO members met on 23July 2014 to discuss further details regarding the 
package.680 One of the major issues was again the use of the 2008 modalities as the way 
forward. Members of the G33 group argued that 2008 modalities are a useful platform to 
continue negotiations.681 However without naming any members, the WTO notes that ‘some 
others’682 believe that the 2008 modalities are too complex and that they would be open to 
alternative approaches.683 
 
The chairperson, Ambassador John Adank stated that all the elements were interrelated and 
that agriculture would have to be dealt with as an overall package.684 However, he 
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emphasised that domestic support and market access require more in-depth discussion.685 In 
order to facilitate these discussions the chairperson circulated a set of questions on the 
domestic support and market access pillars to members on 15 July 2014, stating that, ‘this is 
an initial effort to focus on the more detailed substance of the negotiations in these two 
areas’.686 
 
5.5 SECTION D: RELEVANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa and India are part of the BRICS group of nations. This thesis submits that 
India’s spearheading of the G33 proposal will have positive repercussions on South Africa’s 
agricultural industry. As noted above, through the Bali Ministerial Conference, India 
established that food security programmes can be in harmony with WTO policies. Although 
South Africa cannot implement a food security programme due to the fact that it does not 
currently have one in place, it can nevertheless use its India’s programme through BRICS as 
a platform to further its objectives at the next Ministerial Conference in 2017. 
 
An informal alliance has developed between South Africa and India. One of the elements of 
the Bali Package was the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Wise reports that ‘the United 
States and other exporting countries have pushed hard for firm commitments from developing 
countries on trade facilitation, without even keeping the promises to finance the high costs of 
upgrading port facilities and procedures. Meanwhile, they have offered no reciprocal 
commitment to negotiate in good faith on the flaws in the existing WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, or on the specific Bali issue of public food reserves for food security’.687 Due to 
this double standard, both India and South Africa have insisted that the Bali decision on food 
security must be accorded the same importance as trade facilitation.688 Along with the G33, 
both countries have demanded ‘that the Bali agreement jump-start the stalled Doha Round, 
restoring the original commitment to correct the biases against developing countries in the 
WTO's Agreement on Agriculture and other chapters’.689 
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Wise concurs and argues that South Africa and India are right to resist the abandonment of 
the single undertaking and the advancement of only exporters' economic interests.690 Wise 
concludes: ‘If that means the trade facilitation agreement needs to be held up or made 
‘provisional’ subject to progress on other Bali issues, as India, South Africa and others have 
argued, so be it’.691 
 
Furthermore, Indian Union Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr Shri Anand Sharma has 
indicated that the reference prices for amber box domestic support need to be updated.692 
Since 2006, the G33 has been asking the WTO to reopen the AoA to update the reference 
price to account for inflation.693 The USA has refused, and even after the commitment in Bali 
to resolve the issue, India and the G33 have seen no movement on the food security issue 
while trade facilitation has sped towards implementation.694 
 
More recently, WTO members attended a meeting on 5 June 2014 to initiate informal 
consultations regarding the next Ministerial Conference. Proposals on a permanent solution 
following on Bali were also received this meeting. These proposals will play a key role in 




This chapter analysed the Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali in order to determine the 
extent to which decisions taken at the Conference have and might continue to affect the AoA. 
It outlined the background to the Bali Ministerial Conference and presented an overview of 
what was on the negotiating table. Thereafter the chapter analysed how the Bali Ministerial 
Conference affected the main elements of the AoA, namely market access, domestic support 
and export subsidies. Research has shown that, among these elements, domestic support was 
most affected. 
 
The decision on public stockholding for food security proved to be the most controversial 
agricultural issue at the Bali Ministerial Conference. WTO Members decided on an interim 
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solution, a peace clause allowing public stockholding subject to certain conditions. The key 
issue is that this is an interim solution; therefore, this decision may change as members 
attempt to find a permanent solution to the issue of food security. It is interesting to note that 
the Bali Ministerial Conference changed how WTO members would adopt food security 
policies. In particular, research has revealed that, as a result of the decision at the Bali 
Ministerial Conference, WTO members are now temporarily allowed to exceed their amber 
box commitments in terms of the AoA, subject to certain conditions. This has been a major 
change for developing countries. It remains to be seen whether a final solution will be 
adopted at the next Ministerial Conference.  
 
It is disappointing that the elimination of agricultural export subsidies was not addressed at 
the Bali Ministerial Conference. Despite the benefits of trade facilitation, this thesis submits 
that the elimination of agricultural export subsidies would be of greater importance to 
developing countries. Trade facilitation was given immediate priority, whereas reducing 
agricultural export subsidies was subject to, ‘we will try our best’.695 
 
It is important for South Africa to carefully consider its trade strategy in order to align itself 
within BRICS and to any other trade opportunities that may present themselves outside of 
BRICS. Moreover, South Africa could use BRICS as a platform to further its trade objectives 
at the next WTO Ministerial Conference.696 This would help South Africa to further establish 
its position on the international stage as the gateway to Southern Africa.697 The end result 
would be an increase in foreign investors.698 
 
While the multilateral trading system has been given a ‘lifeline’ through the success of the 
Bali Ministerial Conference, this thesis submits that there is cause for cautious optimism 
regarding the future of the multilateral trading system.699 In the words of the Director General 
of the WTO, Roberto: ‘this (Bali) package is not an end – rather the beginning of the more 
important task of implementing the decisions that were adopted in Bali.’700 
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This thesis aimed to achieve five research objectives with a view to developing a holistic 
understanding of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and its relationship with South Africa 
in the context of BRICS. The first objective was to critically reflect on the history and 
development of agricultural regulation within the International Trade Organisation (ITO), 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The second was to critically examine the core components of the AoA such as market access, 
domestic support and export subsidies, while the third objective sought to analyse criticisms 
and positive views of the AoA in respect of developing countries. Fourthly, the aim was to 
study the AoA in the context of the South African agricultural industry, and further explore 
how this sector may be impacted by the country’s membership of BRICS. The final objective 
was to analyse the 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali with a view to determining the extent to 
which decisions taken at this Conference will affect the AoA. This chapter provides 




6.2.1 Critical reflection on the history and development of agricultural regulation within 
the ITO, GATT and the WTO 
 
The Multilateral Trade System (MTS) has been described as a political process involving the 
complex negotiation of trade rules between member countries.701 The concept of an MTS to 
governing trade originated with the United States of America (USA); it later developed into 
the GATT and finally into the principle-based WTO. As noted previously, the WTO is the 
major body that regulates international trade by facilitating trade negotiations and 
encouraging the development of least-developed economies. Currently, parties are 
                                               




negotiating in the Doha Round which began in 2001 and has yet to be completed.702 The 
overall objective of the Doha Round is to eliminate trade barriers and revise trade rules that 
will assist developing countries.703 
 
A significant aspect of the MTS was the negotiation rounds, where members participated in 
agriculture negotiations, with the most successful being the Uruguay Round. As explained in 
the thesis, the Uruguay Round of negotiations produced the first ever AoA in the history of 
the MTS. This was important because agriculture was not adequately regulated under the 
GATT which resulted in various domestic support programmes such as the European 
Community’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These programs had an impact on 
global agricultural trade as they manipulated the demand and supply of food stocks.704 As 
discussed in chapter three of this thesis, this resulted in subsidised agricultural products from 
developed countries being dumped on developing countries’ markets. 
 
In light of the various free trade agreements and the development of trade groups such as 
BRICS, this thesis submits that the MTS is currently at a very critical stage. The Bali 
Ministerial Conference offered a much welcome lifeline to the MTS, by demonstrating that 
the system can still negotiate and develop meaningful trade rules. However, it is important to 
note that the future of the MTS is still at stake because of the lacklustre Doha Round of trade 
negotiations, and the inability to agree on particular aspects of the AoA. It is therefore 
recommended that both developed and developing countries make trade-offs, such as 
eliminating export subsidies in exchange for trade facilitation, that will favour balanced 
outcomes of mutual benefit to both sides.705 
 
It is further recommended that the WTO investigate a new model of trade negotiations within 
the MTS. The build-up to the Bali Conference was important in this regard as Ministers 
identified a small package of proposals on which there was a good chance of reaching 
agreement. This clearly demonstrated that the key to a successful outcome is to identify those 
issues that parties are willing to agree on and thereafter formalise an agreement. This 
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recommendation is reflected in a statement by the EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel De 
Gucht: 
 
 ‘The limited agreement that was reached in Bali instead of a full deal as hoped, serves as a 
reminder that the objective of concluding the Round may once more face insurmountable 
obstacles. Moreover the choice of proceeding with sectorial agreements rather than defending 
the principle of the ‘Single undertaking’ (nothing is concluded until everything is concluded) 
has allowed for some advances on relatively easy and straightforward issues but makes it 
more arduous to successfully conclude the Round.’706 
 
A possible disadvantage of this approach may be the fact that only easy straightforward 
issues are chosen for each negotiation session, and that the issues that face significant 
opposition by members may be side-lined. Nonetheless, it is recommended that future 
Ministerial Conferences should be dealt with on a sectorial basis, as was done in Bali, as this 
has been proven to achieve consensus between WTO members and may even lead to the 
conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations.  
 
6.2.2 Critical examination of the core AoA components 
  
The AoA came into being at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in January 1995707 with 
the long-term objective of establishing a fair, market-oriented agricultural trading system.708 
The AoA focuses on three main elements of agricultural reform: i) improving agricultural 
market access, ii) reducing domestic support for agricultural production, and iii) eliminating 
export subsidies on agricultural products.  
 
With regard to market access, it is recommended that developing countries negotiate 
improved access to developed countries’ markets.709 Thus, the WTO needs to encourage 
developed countries to facilitate increased market access for developing countries. Guidelines 
and procedures710 should be put in place that make it easier and less cumbersome for 
developing countries to export their agricultural products to developed countries. In 
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exchange, developed countries could receive reciprocal openings in developing countries’ 
markets.    
 
With regard to domestic support, it is recommended that more freedom should be given to 
developing countries to increase their green box domestic support. This is due to the fact that 
this box has shown to have minimal impact on trade. An example is classifying financial and 
skills development support to emerging farmers in developing countries, such as South 
Africa, as green box support. This would assist developing countries to grow their 
agricultural sectors with necessarily violating AoA rules. 
 
With regard to export subsidies, the most significant issue is the fact that agricultural export 
subsidies are still permitted under WTO rules, even though they have been outlawed in other 
sectors.  It is thus recommended that both developed and developing countries reduce their 
domestic budgetary commitments to export subsidies to zero over the next five years. 
 
6.2.3 Investigation and examination of positive views and criticisms of the AoA 
 
Grant and Boys found that accession to the AoA benefited member countries by 161 per 
cent.711 However this thesis disputed this finding on the basis that the given percentage did 
not specify whether it was exclusive to developed, or developed country members. An 
impact-audit by the WTO is therefore recommended that focuses on determining the impact 
of the AoA on developing countries through statistical analysis. 
 
Furthermore, it was noted that criticism of the AoA can be divided into two categories: a) 
criticism of the provisions of the AoA, and b) criticism directed towards its implementation. 
 
With regard to criticism of the provisions of the AoA: 
 
i) The AoA has been criticised for failing to accommodate the needs of developing 
countries by adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach712, and for imposing complex 
domestic support requirements which developing countries find challenging to 
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implement.713 This is contrary to the objective of the Doha Round to facilitate trade 
for developing countries. As noted above, it is recommended that more green box 
subsidies should be allocated to developing countries; 
 
ii) The AoA has, in effect, rewarded member countries for their use of non-tariff barriers 
during the tariffication process, by providing them with exclusive use of special 
safeguard measures.714 This is surprising because the objective of the AoA is to 
establish a fair, market-oriented agricultural trading system.715 Thus it is 
recommended that, at the very least, developing countries should be allowed to 
maintain their special safeguard measures due to the volatility of world markets and 
that developed countries should be prohibited from using special safeguard measures. 
In other words developing countries should be allowed to maintain special safeguard 
measures in order to protect their domestic industries from import surges or price 
depression.716 
 
iii) As discussed under the previous research objective, the AoA has been criticised for its 
provisions that allow for the exclusive use of export subsidies, which have been 
banned in other industries. There have been reduction commitments on export 
subsidies since the inception of the AoA in 1995. However, 19 years later, export 
subsidies still exist in international agricultural trade. The WTO needs to speed up the 
process of phasing out export subsidies. Due to their trade distortion effects, the 
elimination of export subsidies should be an urgent priority and all export subsidies 
from both developed and developing countries should be banned in the next five 
years. 
 
With regard to criticism regarding the implementation of the AoA: 
 
a) Developed countries, particularly the USA, have been accused of using food aid to 
circumvent their commitments under the AoA.717 Although this challenges the 
political status quo, this study recommends that the WTO establish a panel to 
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investigate these allegations. Furthermore, based on the outcome of such 
investigation, it is recommended that the WTO take appropriate remedial action 
against the USA and institute measures to ensure that such conduct is not repeated by 
other members.  
 
b) The AoA’s failure to regulate the dumping of agricultural goods. A recent issue has 
been poultry imports from Brazil into South Africa.718 It is recommended that the 
WTO investigate allegations of dumping; take appropriate remedial action against 
members who have been found ‘guilty’ and institute measures to ensure that dumping 
is not repeated. 
 
c) Developing countries are not given an adequate voice in agricultural negotiations at 
the WTO. It is recommended that developing countries strengthen their negotiation 
resources. At the recent Bali Conference, India managed to persuade members, 
particularly the G33, to vote in favour of its stockholding decision. Based on this 
success, other developing countries should increase their negotiation leverage in order 
to persuade and ‘strike’ the right deals that favour their developmental objectives. 
This can be achieved by lobbying other developing country members to support their 
proposals at the WTO.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis argues that global agricultural regulation is a complex process as it 
involves both political and technical issues. The divide between developed and developing 
countries continues to plague the negotiation process. However there is hope as article 20 of 
the AoA encourages further negotiations on agricultural trade liberalisation.719 
 
6.2.4 Critical description of the extent to which the AoA impacted on agricultural trade 
in South Africa and its trading partners with a particular focus on BRICS 
 
It is important to note that South Africa is compliant in all three main reform areas of the 
AoA. With regard to export subsidies, this thesis submits that South Africa is compliant 
because the country provides zero export subsidies.720 With regard to market access, it is 
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submitted that South Africa is compliant because the country provides for minimum market 
access opportunities for 5 per cent of its domestic consumption.721 With regard to domestic 
support, this thesis submits that South Africa is compliant because the country has not 
exceeded its Aggregate Measure of Support.722 
 
Furthermore, it is estimated that 39.26 per cent of South Africa’s population lives in rural 
areas.723 Smallholder faming provides an important source of income to this segment of the 
population.724 It is therefore recommended that South Africa develop its rural infrastructure 
to facilitate smallholder farming, particularly the transport and storage of agricultural 
products in rural areas as this will boost production which will further drive agricultural 
economic growth.725 
 
South Africa is considered to be a developing country because of the many socio-economic 
issues confronting the country. These include high unemployment, high mortality rates due to 
HIV and Aids, and low levels of education. South Africa will have to address these factors in 
order to grow its agricultural industry. It is also recommended that national and provincial 
government provide more training and financial support programmes, through the green box, 
to assist emerging black farmers to enter mainstream commercial agriculture.726 
 
The Southern African region is considered a water poor area, and it is ranked second in the 
world in terms of water shortages after the Middle East.727 Irrigation significantly improves 
agricultural productivity by improving the yield and quality of crops.728 However a mere 1,5 
per cent of South Africa’s land is under irrigation, which produces 30 per cent of the 
country’s crops.729 Due to the fact that South Africa has no surplus water, future irrigation 
will be constrained.730 Furthermore, farmers will have to double their use of water by 2050 if 
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they are to meet growing food demands using current farming practices.731 Therefore it is 
recommended that water supply be monitored carefully in order increase efficiency and 
promote irrigation of crops. This will result in increased yields and better quality crops.732 
 
The global economy has undergone many changes in the past 20 years,733 the most significant 
of which has been the mushrooming of emerging economies, most notably those of 
BRICS.734 As noted above, these changes have had an impact on WTO negotiations with 
more developing countries gaining political clout at the highest levels.735 By virtue of South 
Africa’s membership of BRICS, Africa as a continent has established a stronger presence at 
the WTO table.736 The time has come for South Africa to foster relationships within BRICS 
and, in particular, use the group as a platform to further its own development objectives at the 
WTO. 
 
6.2.5 Analysis of the 9th Ministerial Conference in Bali with a view to determining the 
extent to which decisions at the Conference will affect the AoA 
 
As noted in chapter five, the decision on public stockholding for food security proved to be 
the most controversial agricultural issue at the Bali Ministerial Conference. WTO Members 
decided on an interim solution, a peace clause allowing public stockholding subject to certain 
conditions. The key issue is that this is an interim solution; therefore this decision may 
change as members attempt to find a permanent solution to the issue of food security. It is 
important to note that the Bali Ministerial Conference changed how WTO members adopt 
food security policies. In particular, members are now temporarily allowed to exceed their 
amber box commitments in terms of the AoA, subject to certain conditions. This has been a 
major change for developing countries. While progress has been made, it is recommended 
that the interim food stockholding decision made in Bali should be maintained in the form of 
a ‘permanent decision’ taken at the next Ministerial Conference. In other words, countries 
should be permanently allowed to developed food security policies for domestic use, without 
being regarded as infringing amber box commitments. 
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Finally, it is important for South Africa to carefully consider its trade strategy in order to 
align itself with BRICS and to any other trade opportunities. South Africa could use BRICS 
as a platform to further its trade objectives at the next WTO Ministerial Conference.737 This 
would help the country to further establish its position on the international stage as the 
gateway to Southern Africa.738 Ultimately this could result in an increase in foreign 
investors.739 
 
The MTS has been given a ‘lifeline’ through the success of the Bali Ministerial Conference. 
However, this thesis submits that there is cause for cautious optimism regarding the future of 
the MTS as follow-up deliberations are required to ensure the further liberalisation of the 




This study has provided a holistic understanding of international agricultural regulation, by 
considering the historical development and analysing the main agreement that regulates 
international agricultural trade. It also contributed to knowledge by examining the AoA in the 
context of the South African agricultural industry, and exploring how this sector will be 
impacted by the country’s membership of BRICS. 
 
The AoA set out to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system. Since its 
inception in 1995, progress has been made. However progress has not been as efficient and 
long-lasting as in other industries because the AoA has many inherent flaws and 
implementation issues. These issues will have to be addressed by members at the next 
Ministerial Conference. This thesis ultimately recommends that the AoA needs to be 
reformed and that developing countries should provide more input into a redrafted AoA that 
would promote their development objectives. It argues that developing countries are gaining 
more negotiating power at the WTO table, especially when one considers how India and the 
G33 argued their proposals at the last Ministerial Conference in Bali. Therefore, as a 
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developing country and a member of BRICS, South Africa has an opportunity to organize 
itself into a highly developed nation in time to come.  
 
As the world moves further into this millennium, global demand for food will continue to 
grow; it is estimated that by 2050, the world will need to feed nine billion people.741 
Therefore the regulation of agriculture will become even more important. The policies that 
the international community puts in place can have the effect of increasing food production, 
thereby ensuring food security, or limiting producers’ potential, causing food shortages. 
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